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ESSAY
DO U.S. COURTS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST TREATIES?:
EQUIVALENCE, DUALITY, AND
NON-SELF-EXECUTION
David H. Moore*
Despite the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, only self-
executing treaties are immediately enforceable in U.S. courts. The Supreme
Court confirmed as much in its recent decision in Medellin v. Texas,
which adopted a broad notion of non-self-execution. Most foreign relations
law scholars seek to limit the incidence of non-self-execution. They argue,
among other things, that non-self-execution violates the Supremacy Clause,
which mandates equivalent treatment of the Constitution, statutes, and trea-
ties. A minority of scholars have responded by arguing variously that the
doctrine of non-self-execution does not discriminate against treaties, that the
Constitution does not require equivalence, and that differential treatment is
justified by treaties' dual nature-they are, first, instruments of foreign af-
fairs and, second, domestic law.
This Essay introduces a new argument in favor of a broad notion of
non-self-execution. Rather than emphasize the unique duality of treaties,
this Essay highlights that the Constitution and statutes also possess a dual
nature. While their primary role is as domestic law, they also play a role in
foreign relations, particularly when they apply extraterritorially. Recent gui-
dance from the Supreme Court on the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution and statutes permits a timely comparison of the judicial treat-
ment of all three sources of supreme law in their areas of secondary applica-
tion. Comparison along this new axis reveals that treaties fare better than
statutes under even a broad notion of non-self-execution. The new analysis
thus advances the argument for non-selfexecution. The comparison also has
important implications for other issues bearing on the domestic status of
treaties.
INTRODUCTION
Article II of the Constitution authorizes the President, "by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
* Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This Essay was
begun during my tenure as a Visiting Professor at the George Washington University Law
School; I am grateful to the law school for its generous financial support. I wish to thank
John Fee, RonNell Andersen Jones, Carolina Ntifiez, Lisa Grow Sun, as well as participants
in the BYU Law School Works-in-Progress Series for comments on earlier drafts of this
Essay. I also thank William Hains, Danielle Jones, Matthew Ling, and Landon Magnusson
for helpful research and editorial assistance, and Shawn Nevers for exceptional library
support. This Essay is dedicated to Teah Eden Moore.
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thirds of the Senators present concur."' The Supremacy Clause declares
that, like the Constitution and statutes, "all" treaties "shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land."2 Despite use of the word "all," some treaties are
not automatically enforceable in U.S. courts. The Supreme Court held in
1829, in the landmark case of Foster v. Neilson, that only self-executing
treaties immediately provide rules of decision.3 The majority of foreign
relations scholars oppose expansive classification of treaties as non-self-
executing.4 That opposition has recently trained on the Supreme Court's
decision in Medellin v. Texas,5 and understandably so, as Medellin arguably
eclipsed Foster as the Court's most important pronouncement on the do-
mestic status of treaties and endorsed a broad notion of non-self-
execution. 6
One of the grounds on which foreign relations law scholars chal-
lenge non-self-execution is that it violates a constitutional principle of
equivalence. The Supremacy Clause designates the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties as supreme federal law.7 In doing so, the argument goes, the
Supremacy Clause requires equivalent treatment of all three sources.8
Defenders of non-self-execution respond, in effect, by arguing variously
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. In its entirety, the Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
3. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829) (recognizing that some treaties are non-self-
executing and require congressional implementation to be judicially enforceable),
abrogated by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (concluding that
treaty provision found to be non-self-executing in Foster was self-executing, but not
rejecting the notion of non-self-execution). But cf. Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 571, 578, 607-08 (2007) (tracing doctrine of non-self-execution to 1788 state decision,
Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393, 403-04 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1788) (holding Treaty of
Peace required legislative action to secure restitution for prior confiscations), and to
Supreme Court's 1796 decision in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244 (1796) (Chase,
J.) (acknowledging possibility that "treaty may stipulate, that certain acts shall be done by
the Legislature," but holding Treaty of Peace required no legislative action before courts
could enforce)).
4. See infra Part I (discussing scholarly opposition to broad non-self-execution).
5. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
6. See Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 131,
132 [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Duality] ("[Medellin] contains the most extensive
discussion of treaty self-execution in the Court's history."); David H. Moore, Medellin, the
Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of International Law, 50 Va. J. Int'l L. 485, 486,
490-91 (2010) [hereinafter Moore, Medellin and the ATS] (noting importance of decision
and expansiveness of non-self-execution under Medellin); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1601, 1611-12,
1618-20 (2008) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism] (noting breadth of non-
self-execution under Medellin).
7. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text (discussing equivalence principle).
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that treatment of the Constitution and statutes is equivalent with the
treatment of treaties that results from the doctrine of non-self-execution,
that the Supremacy Clause does not require equivalence, and that the
dual international and domestic nature of treaties warrants differential
treatment.9
This Essay takes a new approach. It accepts that treaties have a dual
nature. They principally affect foreign relations, but they also play a role
as domestic law. The Essay does not, however, rely on treaty duality to
question whether the Constitution requires equivalent treatment of con-
stitutional, statutory, and treaty law, as past arguments have. Rather, the
Essay highlights that the Constitution and statutes also have a dual na-
ture. Like treaties, the Constitution and statutes play a role in foreign
relations, most obviously when they apply extraterritorially. While this
foreign relations role is primary for treaties, it is secondary for the
Constitution and statutes. Once the dual role of all three sources of su-
preme federal law is recognized, it becomes apparent that those who
complain that non-self-execution produces differential treatment are
comparing judicial treatment of the Constitution and statutes in their pri-
mary (domestic) role against the treatment of treaties in their secondary
(domestic) role. This Essay employs a new comparative axis: treatment
of all three sources in their areas of secondary application. Comparing
judicial treatment of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their sec-
ondary arenas reveals, critically, that treaties fare well even under a broad
conception of non-self-execution, lending support to the minority posi-
tion in the contemporary debate over self-execution. The comparison
also has important implications for other issues surrounding the domes-
tic status of treaties.
To develop these insights, Part I surveys scholarly opposition to the
doctrine of non-self-execution, with particular emphasis on the equiva-
lence argument. Part II notes academic responses to the equivalence the-
sis, including arguments based on the duality of treaties. Parts III and IV
demonstrate the dual nature of the Constitution and statutes and justify
comparison of the judicial treatment of all three sources in their secon-
dary roles. Part V details the judicial treatment of each source in its area
of secondary application. Part VI compares this judicial treatment, con-
cluding that even a broad doctrine of non-self-execution does not dis-
criminate against treaties and that the comparison has important implica-
tions for other issues touching on treaties' domestic status.
I. OPPOSITION To NON-SELF-EXECUTION
While scholars often cast their opposition to non-self-execution in
sweeping terms, antagonism toward non-self-execution is a matter of
9. See infra Part II (discussing various responses to equivalence principle).
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degree.10 Opponents of non-self-execution agree that treaties that at-
tempt certain tasks constitutionally assigned to Congress are non-self-
executing." They disagree only over which obligations Congress must
perform. Some would impose non-self-execution only if a treaty attempts
to declare war.1 2 Others would also treat as non-self-executing treaty at-
tempts to appropriate funds, criminalize conduct, and/or raise revenue
through new taxes or tariffs.' 3
Likewise, some critics of non-self-execution concede that U.S.
treatymakers may render a treaty non-self-executing through a clear state-
ment to that effect.14 For some, the statement may appear in the treaty
10. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 67 (2003)
[hereinafter Paust, International Law] (noting "[t]he distinction found in certain cases
between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-executing' treaties is a judicially invented notion
that is patently inconsistent with [the] express language" of the Supremacy Clause);
Moore, Medell(n and the ATS, supra note 6, at 488-90 (reviewing scope of scholarly
critiques of non-self-execution).
11. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 111(4)(c) (1987) (noting non-self-execution is generally assumed where international
agreement would achieve what lies within Congress's exclusive lawmaking power under
Constitution); id. § 111 cmt. i (same); id. § 111 reporter's note 6 (same); Ernest A. Young,
Treaties as "Part of Our Law," 88 Tex. L. Rev. 91, 121 (2009) (noting "[a]ll participants in
the self-execution debate seem to accept . .. constitutionally prescribed categories of non-
self-execution").
12. Paust, International Law, supra note 10, at 75-78, 80.
13. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 111(4)(c) (discussing support for position that treaties that declare war, criminalize
conduct, or appropriate funds are non-self-executing); id. § 111 cmt. i (same); id. § 111
reporter's note 6 (same); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a
Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 49 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, Non-Self-
Executing] ("[A] treaty provision requiring a contribution of funds would not be
'made . . . under the [A]uthority of the United States' for purposes of domestic law,
because the treaty makers lack the authority to appropriate funds themselves, and they lack
the authority to compel Congress to appropriate funds." (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2)); Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2177-78
(1999) [hereinafter Vzquez, Laughing at Treaties] ("One example of something that,
under our Constitution, can only be done by statute is the appropriation of money.");
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 630, 668 (2008) [hereinafter
Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land] (stating, at minimum, treaties attempting to
criminalize or appropriate are non-self-executing); cf. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and
the United States Constitution 203 (2d ed. 1996) (agreeing that treaties cannot
appropriate money or criminalize conduct without taking position on whether treaties may
declare war).
14. See, e.g., Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 13, at 2174-75, 2186-88
(accepting constitutionality of reservations declaring treaties non-self-executing); Vdzquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 609, 643, 694 (concluding Constitution
grants treatymakers power to attach declarations of non-self-execution and to render
treaties non-self-executing "through a clear statement that the obligations imposed by the
treaty are subject to legislative implementation"); cf. Paust, International Law, supra note
10, at 71-73, 80 (recognizing treaties may "by their terms" be non-self-executing); Jordan J.
Paust, Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31
Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 301, 329 (2008) ("[Self-execution analysis] involves attention to
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itself or in a declaration accompanying U.S. ratification of the treaty.1 5
For others, declarations of non-self-execution are unconstitutional. 16 In-
deed, some perceive self-execution as a constitutional mandate that can-
not be overcome by a clear statement of U.S. intent, regardless of where
the statement appears.' 7
the text of the treaty in light of the treaty's context and object and purpose and can
include inquiry with respect to the probable intent (express and implied) of its creators as
well as in light of other international law and subsequent international practice and
expectations." (footnotes omitted)).
15. See Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 13, at 2158 (arguing self-execution
is default rule but rule "may be reversed by the treatymakers through a clear statement in
the treaty itself (or reservation thereto)"); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra
note 13, at 609, 611, 681-85, 694 (concluding that declarations of non-self-execution are
valid "as long as the declarations are deposited along with the United States's instruments
of ratification").
16. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 202 (arguing practice of attaching
declarations of non-self-execution "is 'anti-Constitutional' in spirit and highly problematic
as a matter of law"); Malvina Halberstam, Alvarez-Machain II: The Supreme Court's
Reliance on the Non-Self-Executing Declaration in the Senate Resolution Giving Advice
and Consent to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 J. Nat'l Security
L. & Pol'y 89, 92, 95-97, 110-11 (2005) ("[A] declaration that a treaty .. . that by its terms
would be self-executing is not self-executing, is inconsistent with the language, history, and
purpose of [the Supremacy Clause]."); id. at 92, 95-97, 110-11 (rejecting non-self-
executing declarations as unconstitutional); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law
and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, 324
(1999) ("[A] declaration of non-self-execution, even if not void under international law, is
unconstitutional and void under the Supremacy Clause."); Stefan A. Riesenfeld &
Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and
Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 571, 599 (1991) (noting "[a]n ancillary power
of the Senate to deny self-execution directly contradicts" the Framers' intent "that treaties
be given direct effect in U.S. law when by their terms and context they are self-executing");
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 13, at 43-44 (acknowledging declarations of non-self-
execution may prevent treaty from creating private causes of action but asserting they may
not prevent courts from considering treaty-based defenses). But see Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.
399, 446-51 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent] (defending
constitutionality of declarations of non-self-execution).
17. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 202-03 ("[N]othing in the Constitution ...
suggested that treaties which the Constitution declares to be law of the land need not be
'faithfully executed' by the President, or enforced by the courts, because the President or
the Senate (or both) so decided."); Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 13, at 45-70
(criticizing declarations of non-self-execution as unconstitutional); David Sloss,
Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 43 Tex. Int'l L.J. 15, 18 (2007) (arguing treatymakers do not
have "the constitutional power to opt out of the Supremacy Clause by 'manifesting an
intention' that a particular treaty 'shall not become effective as domestic law'" (quoting
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111(4)(a))). But
cf. David Sloss, Medellin v. Texas: Part I: Self-Execution, The Federalist Society Online
Debate Series (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Sloss, Self-Execution Debate], at
http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.1 7/default.asp (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (suggesting that conditions attached to treaty by President and Senate are
generally binding as matter of federal law, at least insofar as conditions address which
branch of government is required to take action to implement treaty).
2232
2010] EQUIVALENCE, DUALITY, AND NON-SELF-EXECUTION 2233
Finally, some find it uncontroversial that treaty obligations may be
non-self-executing if they are vague or precatory, or perhaps if they ad-
dress only state-to-state obligations or speak to nonjudicial branches of
the government, as an arms control treaty might.1 8 In short, non-self-
execution, in retail form, generates little to no controversy. The target of
scholarly criticism is a more wholesale doctrine of non-self-execution.
One basis for challenging a broad notion of non-self-execution, such
as that found in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin v.
Texas,19 is the principle of equivalence. 20 In its fullest form, the equiva-
lence principle holds that the Supremacy Clause mandates the same judi-
18. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 549-50, 560 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that treaties on particular subjects, such as military conflict, more likely
address political branches); Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 13, at 27-31 (noting
treaty provisions imposing "horizontal" duties between nations are not enforceable by
private individuals); Vizquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 13, at 2178-83 ("That the
courts may not enforce [precatory or aspirational] provisions is not problematic. . . .
Another type of nonjusticiable provision consists of those that are too vague for judicial
enforcement."); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 609, 630-31, 643
(identifying the following treaties as non-self executing: treaties that are vague, that are
clearly "'addressed' solely to the legislature," or that "call for judgments of a nonjudicial
nature"); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1122 n.145, 1140 (1992) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights]
(acknowledging that treaties, like arms control treaties, addressing only state-to-state
obligations may be non-self-executing); id. at 1123-33 (comparing precatory treaties and
treaties addressed to legislature with judicially unenforceable statutes under political
question doctrine); cf. David Sloss, United States, in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty
Enforcement 504, 511 (David Sloss ed., 2009) [hereinafter Sloss, United States] (defining
precatory treaty as one "that does not impose binding obligations on the United States as a
matter of international law").
19. Medellin, 552 U.S. 491.
20. Some suggest that the equivalence thesis is also reflected in the last-in-time rule.
See Wu, supra note 3, at 578 ("The equivalence view leads also to the 'last-in-time rule' that
treaties trump prior statutes and vice versa."). Professor Vdzquez asserts otherwise. In his
view, "[t]he requirement of equivalent treatment concerns the consequences for domestic
courts of treaties that are in force as a matter of domestic law. The last-in-time rule
concerns whether a treaty is in force as a matter of domestic law." Vdzquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land, supra note 13, at 612. It is not clear that the Supremacy Clause may be read
so finely. If the Clause requires equivalency, it is not clear why equivalency would extend
to how domestic courts treat constitutional, statutory, and treaty provisions and not to how
the three sources stack up in the event of conflict, an issue that arises in court and thus
involves judicial treatment. As a result, the last-in-time rule arguably bears on the
equivalence thesis. The rule does not support equivalency in principle or practice. The
rule only permits self-executing treaties to trump prior inconsistent statutes. See Medellin,
552 U.S. at 518 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933), for proposition that
"later-in-time self-executing treaty supersedes a federal statute if there is a conflict");
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("If [a treaty and a statute] are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of
the treaty on the subject is self executing."). But cf. Sloss, United States, supra note 18, at
509 (arguing "some non-self-executing treaties ... trump prior inconsistent statutes"). The
rule thus assumes that some-but does not dictate whether-treaties will be non-self-
executing and requires equivalent treatment only for self-executing treaties. Bradley,
Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 160; see also Wu, supra note 3, at 595-96 ("[N]on-self-
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cial treatment of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties. Of course, the
principle immediately admits one exception. The Constitution trumps
statutes and treaties that run afoul of its terms. Consequently, leading
treaty scholar Carlos Vdzquez admits that "[t]he Constitution is . .. supe-
rior to federal statutes and treaties,"2 1 and Tim Wu claims only that the
text of the Supremacy Clause "suggests a rough equivalence in the legal
status of' statutes and treaties. 22
Similarly, the equivalence thesis has been defined with more or less
exactitude. Under Wu's "rough equivalence" standard, "treaty language,
when raised in court, usually ought to have effects no different from the
exact same language found in the United States Code."23 Under a more
exacting view of equivalence, "treaties are presumptively enforceable in
court in the same circumstances as constitutional and statutory provisions
of like content."2 4 This does not mean that treaties are always enforcea-
ble. Like other sources of law, a treaty might be unenforceable because,
inter alia, the plaintiff lacks standing, the remedy sought is inappropriate,
execution . .. can be, and [is], used to prevent a later-in-time treaty from abrogating an
earlier statute.").
In practice, moreover, any suggestion of equivalence has not been realized. See
Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 160 ("[D]espite the [last-in-time] doctrine, it
appears that courts have been quite reluctant to allow treaties to displace statutes."); Wu,
supra note 3, at 595-97 ("[I]t might be clearer and more reflective of treaty practice to say
that a later-in-time treaty will override an earlier-in-time statute only when it explicitly does
so."). First, in the only Supreme Court case to have enforced a treaty over a prior statute,
Cook, 288 U.S. 102, the treaty was enforced against the United States at the United States'
request. Wu, supra note 3, at 596-97. That is, the treaty was enforced against the Coast
Guard at the Solicitor General's urging as the Coast Guard's actions not only violated the
treaty but contravened instructions from the Justice Department. Id.
Second, "because non-self-execution or other doctrines of deference can be, and are,
used to prevent a later-in-time treaty from abrogating an earlier statute, the last-in-time
rule is not a full or accurate portrayal of judicial practice." Id. at 595-96. Professor
Bradley makes this point in reading Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), as well as Power Authority of New
York v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), as illustrating judicial
"reluctance to allow treaties to displace" statutes. Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at
160-62. The practical application of the last-in-time rule thus undercuts the equivalence
thesis.
Finally, although the last-in-time rule is not the focus of this Essay, this Essay has
obvious implications for that rule. If a broad formulation of the non-self-execution
doctrine is appropriate, the last-in-time rule will apply in fewer instances.
21. Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 611.
22. Wu, supra note 3, at 577.
23. Id. at 577-78.
24. Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 602, 606, 609; cf. John C.
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1978 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]
(describing claim "that the plain text of the Supremacy Clause equates treaties with
constitutional and statutory provisions" and requires that all three sources be immediately
judicially enforceable).
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or the provision invoked calls for the exercise of nonjudicial discretion. 2 5
But the notion that a treaty otherwise may be unenforceable in domestic
courts in the absence of a clear statement to that effect, the argument
goes, knows no parallel in the constitutional or statutory contexts and
therefore runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.2 6 Under both the rough
and more exacting versions of the equivalence thesis, a broad formula-
tion of the doctrine of non-self-execution violates the equivalence re-
quirement. "The full legal effects that equivalence promises are blocked
by . . . the doctrine of non-self-execution." 27
II. RESPONSES TO THE EQUIVALENCE THESIS
Responses to the equivalence thesis have followed three tracks (often
melding more than one).28 First, scholars have argued that non-self-
execution does not result in differential treatment. The Constitution and
statutes, they note, also may be non-self-executing. These arguments
tend to focus on the scope of lawmaking authority, rather than the status
of resulting law, and assert that lawmakers can create non-self-executing
constitutional and statutory provisions just as they can create non-self-
executing treaty obligations. The other two tracks seek to undercut the
equivalency requirement, albeit in different ways. The second approach,
which takes various forms, looks to constitutional text, history, purpose,
and precedent to argue that there is no equivalency requirement. The
25. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 141 (discussing ways in which
designation "as supreme law of the land" does not equate "with automatic judicial
enforceability"); VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 602-03, 605, 627
(suggesting questions regarding standing, appropriateness of remedy, and existence of
judicially enforceable standards "generate impressive difficulties" in "[a]ttempts to enforce
the Constitution[,] . . . federal statutes," and treaties); see also Sloss, Self-Execution
Debate, supra note 17 (noting "Article III 'case or controversy' requirement" applies
equally to treaties and statutes). Vdzquez harmonizes Medellin with his equivalence thesis
by reading Medellin as labeling the relevant treaty obligation non-self-executing because it
called for nonjudicial discretion. Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at
602, 608-09, 651-67.
26. Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 600-09.
27. Wu, supra note 3, at 578; cf. Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties-A Cinderella Story, 102
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 412, 412 (2008) (lamenting that, due to current conception of
non-self-execution, "U.S. courts are increasingly reluctant to employ the treaty in
exercising their judicial function with the same fervor as its two Supremacy Clause
siblings-the Constitution and the statute"). At the same time, Professor Wu "takes no
particular position on whether more or less judicial enforcement of treaties is a good
thing." Wu, supra note 3, at 577. Instead, his goal is to identify what actually motivates
judges in deciding whether to enforce treaty provisions. Id. at 599-600. He concludes that
self-execution is, in actuality, a doctrine of deference based on "concern for domestic
government structure"; the doctrine leads to great deference to congressional breach, no
deference to state breach, and some deference to executive interpretation of treaties that
results in differing levels of deference to executive breach. Id. at 576-77, 579, 580, 583-94.
28. I use the term "response" not because all these arguments expressly addressed the
equivalence thesis but because these arguments, in effect, counter that thesis.
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third approach asserts that treaties' dual nature justifies differential
treatment.
A. Non-Self-Execution Does Not Discriminate Against Treaties
Non-self-execution, the first argument asserts, does not result in dif-
ferential treatment of treaties. Instead, it produces effects that lawmakers
also attach to the Constitution and statutes. Just as treatymakers may cre-
ate something less than a judicially enforceable treaty, those authorized
to amend the Constitution or to make statutes may create something less
than preemptive, judicially enforceable federal law.2 9 Statutes may "ex-
pressly eschew preemption of state law, . . . authorize states to opt out of
federal requirements, . . . and . . . not impose binding obligations."3 0
Congress may, to some extent, limit federal jurisdiction to hear federal
statutory claims.3 1 Congress may also enact "l[c] onditional spending pro-
visions and statutory delegations of discretionary authority to the
Executive" that often are "not judicially enforceable."3 2  Many believe
that Congress may also limit judicial enforcement of congressional-
29. David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-
Execution, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 32, 34 (2009) [hereinafter Moore, Law(makers) of the
Land], at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/122/decemberO8/forum_57.php (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Young, supra note 11, at 95, 113, 125-28, 137,
140 (explaining that statutes can be non-self-executing in same manner as treaties).
Defenders of non-self-execution have also relied on the fact that principles of standing and
the political question doctrine may prevent judicial enforcement of statutory or
constitutional claims. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 141-42 ("[J]udicial
enforceability is not a prerequisite for status as supreme law of the land."). As noted above,
critics of non-self-execution generally accept that treaties also may be subject to these
limitations. See supra text accompanying note 25 (listing ways in which claims, including
treaty claims, may be nonjusticiable). This section focuses, not on this common ground,
but on other reasons why the Constitution and statutes effectively may be non-self-
executing.
30. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 34 (footnotes omitted); see
also Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 141 & n.42 ("[E]ven though the Supremacy
Clause makes statutes supreme over state law, Congress sometimes enacts statutes that
expressly do not preempt state law."); Young, supra note 11, at 126-27 (describing types of
statutes that do not create enforceable rights); Nick Rosenkranz, Medellin v. Texas: Part I:
Self-Execution, The Federalist Society Online Debate Series (Mar. 28, 2008), at http://
www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting "Congress regularly passes non-binding resolutions" and enacts nonpreemptive
and aspirational statutes). But see Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 13, at 42 (arguing
that under Supremacy Clause statutes may disclaim field preemption but not conflict
preemption); Vdzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism, supra note 6, at 1620-21 (disputing
analogy between nonbinding resolutions and non-self-executing treaties). Congress also
enacts legislation that does not preempt existing federal law. Bradley & Goldsmith,
Conditional Consent, supra note 16, at 447 & n.216.
31. Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 141 & n.39 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592 (1988)).
32. Id. at 141; see also Young, supra note 11, at 127 (discussing non-self-executing
statutes that leave "operative details to be filled in by agency regulations" and conditional
spending provisions that appear judicially unenforceable).
2236 [Vol. 110:2228
2010] EQUIVALENCE, DUALITY, AND NON-SELF-EXECUTION 2237
executive agreements, which are approved through the normal statutory
process.3 3 In addition, "Congress routinely delegates to the executive the
opportunity to define the domestic effect of laws by enacting regulations
and to decide when to prosecute violations of the law, profoundly affect-
ing the law's domestic application."34 Non-self-execution has a similar
effect, delegating to the President and Congress "the task of giving treaty
obligations domestic content and effect."35 And, at least when it comes
to the exercise of lawmaking power, delegation to the primary federal
lawmakers is less problematic than delegation of effective lawmaking au-
thority to the Executive.3 6
Just as Congress may create something less than preemptive, enforce-
able statutes, so those with authority to enact constitutional law have
crafted constitutional provisions with limited reach. Initially, the
Constitution was amended to add "a Bill of Rights applicable only to the
federal government."3 7 Even the Fourteenth Amendment has not led to
wholesale application of Bill of Rights guarantees to the states.3 8 Article
III of the Constitution, addressing the existence and authority of the fed-
eral judiciary, contemplates legislative implementation.3 9 And certain
33. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 142 & n.44, 164 (noting
congressional-executive agreements "actually are statutes" and that "[ilt is . . . widely
accepted that Congress can limit the domestic enforceability of" such agreements); Bradley
& Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 16, at 447 ("[Ilt is widely accepted that
Congress and the President can limit the self-executing effect of [congressional-executive]
agreements.").
34. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 41; see also John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution,
99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2244-45 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Public Lawmaking]
("Administrative law schemes recognize that certain federal mandates are to be enforced
by the executive branch, rather than by Congress or the courts."); Young, supra note 11, at
127, 132-33 (describing statutes that "impose no direct obligations on private actors until
administrative agencies take further action" and "statute [s] imposting] binding obligations
that" nonetheless permit "considerable [government] discretion concerning the execution
of those obligations"). But cf. Vdzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism, supra note 6, at 1616-17
(acknowledging analogy between non-self-execution and delegation of regulatory
authority but asserting analogy's limitations). Congressional delegation to the Executive
may be explicit or implicit. See John 0. McGinnis, Medellfn and the Future of
International Delegations, 118 Yale L.J. 1712, 1731-32 (2009) (discussing express and
implied delegations to executive agencies).
35. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 41; see also Bradley, Treaty
Duality, supra note 6, at 142 ("In a treaty, the Senate and President might similarly
delegate domestic implementation discretion to nonjudicial actors-that is, to either
Congress or the Executive Branch.").
36. See, e.g., Young, supra note 11, at 130 (noting that, at least in theory, statutes may
not delegate lawmaking authority to executive agencies).
37. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 34; see Christina Duffy
Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 Colum. L.
Rev. 973, 977 (2009) [hereinafter Burnett, Convenient Constitution] (noting not all Bill of
Rights guarantees have been applied to the states via Fourteenth Amendment).
38. Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 977, 1020-26.
39. Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2246.
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provisions of the Constitution are nonjusticiable.4 0 In short, the Consti-
tution and statutes may also partake of the qualities of non-self-executing
treaties, rendering non-self-execution consistent with an equivalence
mandate.
B. The Constitution Does Not Require Equivalence
Alternatively, scholars have argued that the Constitution does not re-
quire equivalence. Various (sometimes overlapping) theories have been
advanced along this line. The first, which has emerged ad hoc from argu-
ments by various scholars, relies on the Supremacy Clause's text, context,
and purpose in concluding that the Clause does not require equivalence.
A second, more comprehensive position asserts that treaties that address
matters within Congress's enumerated powers are non-self-executing. A
third posits that the Supremacy Clause creates three tiers of federal law,
with treaties as the bottom tier. At the bottom tier, treaties may be self-
executing only when they do not conflict with existing legislation.
1. The Text, Context, and Purpose of the Supremacy Clause Do Not Require
Equivalence. - The text of the Supremacy Clause provides some general
support for an equivalence requirement.41 After all, the Clause declares
each source of law-Constitution, statutes, and treaties-to "be the su-
preme Law of the Land" and expressly declares that "all Treaties" shall
have that status.42 The Clause itself, however, differentiates between the
Constitution and statutes on the one hand and treaties on the other. The
Constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to the ratified Constitution
are supreme federal law while treaties made both before and after consti-
tutional ratification are supreme.43 The distinction is arguably unimpor-
tant for present purposes: Post-ratification, the Constitution as well as
any statutes or treaties thereafter created qualify for supreme status.
Thus, although the text explicitly differentiates between items in the list
on this issue, one might assert that in every other sense these sources of
law should be treated as equal.
40. Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 Am.
J. Int'l L. 540, 550 (2008) [hereinafter Bradley, Intent]; Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note
6, at 141.
41. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760, 760 (1988)
[hereinafter Paust, Self-Executing] (arguing distinction between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties is "patently inconsistent with express language" of Supremacy
Clause); VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 614 ("[The Supremacy
Clause's bare text] strongly suggests that treaties are to be applied by judges in the same
circumstances as federal statutes and . . . the Constitution."); Wu, supra note 3, at 577
(noting text of Supremacy Clause "suggests a rough equivalence in the legal status of"
treaties and statutes); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 1978 (summarizing textual
argument for equivalence).
42. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 13, at
2169 ("No interpretation is necessary to conclude that [the Supremacy Clause] purports to
give 'all' treaties the status of domestic law.").
43. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Yet the equivalence perspective accepts that the Constitution is supe-
rior in stature to laws and treaties." The notion that inclusion in the
same list suggests equivalent treatment does not hold with regard to the
Constitution. Once the presumption of equivalence is overcome in such
a critical respect, the assertion that equivalence prevails in any other con-
text is at least suspect. One might respond that the Supremacy Clause's
grouping of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties nonetheless supports
equivalent treatment in all other respects once the Clause is read in its
broader context. That is, once one recognizes that the Constitution cre-
ates and defines the authority to make treaties and statutes, one can easily
conclude that the Constitution is more fundamental than treaties and
statutes.45
However, just as there is no sense that the Supremacy Clause limits
the Constitution's superior status as the source of lawmaking and
treatymaking authority, there is no reason to believe that the Supremacy
Clause precludes authority to enter treaties that attempt less than the
Supremacy Clause allows.4 6 The Supremacy Clause explicitly binds state
judges to the Constitution, laws, and treaties in the face of inconsistent
state constitutional and statutory law.47 This provision requires judges to
follow the dictates of the federal Constitution, treaties, and laws, but it
does not say that these sources must preempt state law. The Supremacy
Clause does not attempt to limit the authority of the lawmakers to create
something less than preemptive law. 48 Indeed, the Constitution autho-
44. See V1zquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 611 ("The
Constitution is, of course, superior to federal statutes and treaties."). There are a variety of
arguments as to why the Constitution is supreme. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan, The Three
Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1479, 1499 n.99, 1502, 1633 (2006) ("The
Constitution is higher law made by We the People-it is more democratic than any other
law.").
45. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 40 ("The Constitution is
'more supreme,' perhaps given its role as the organic document giving rise to, defining the
creation of, and, at least as to statutes, delineating the content of the other forms of law.").
46. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 16, at 446 ("[T]he
[Supremacy] Clause does not ... operate as a limit on federal lawmaking power."); Moore,
Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 34-35 (describing instances where lawmakers
have "create[d] something less than what the Supremacy Clause allows"); cf. Bradley,
Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 179 (suggesting Medell(n Court endorsed lesser included
power to decide domestic effect of treaties when it concluded President acted against
treatymakers' will in attempting to execute U.S. treaty obligations toward ICJ). But see
Vdzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism, supra note 6, at 1620-21 (asserting Constitution
cannot accommodate lesser power to enter treaties that are not domestic law).
47. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. See, e.g., Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 143 ("The inclusion of treaties
in the Supremacy Clause simply, but very importantly, allows the U.S. treaty-makers to
preempt state law [through judicial enforcement] if they want to . . . ."); id. at 147 ("The
federalism orientation of the Supremacy Clause is further reflected in the fact that it refers
only to state judges and state laws and does not mention the federal political branches.");
Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 33-34 (arguing Supremacy "Clause was
not designed to address the scope of the federal treatymakers' authority to control the
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rizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution [not only legislative powers but] all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States."49 The Constitution thus anticipates that Congress may step in to
execute obligations assumed through the treaty power.
Moreover, the Supremacy Clause does not explicitly address how the
supreme status of treaties might limit statutory or constitutional lawmak-
ing authority.5 0 One might expect a Constitution grounded in checks
and balances to address that issue before it would address limitations on
the treatymakers' ability to create something less than the Supremacy
Clause allows.51 The Supremacy Clause, however, simply fails to address
the relation of all three sources of federal law.52 Its very placement
outside Articles I to III, which address the relative powers of the three
federal branches, bolsters this conclusion.5 3 The fact that the Take Care
Clause 54 separately addresses the Executive's obligations with regard to
statutes and perhaps treaties likewise suggests that the Supremacy Clause
domestic implementation of treaty duties" and "its textual focus remains on limiting the
discretion of judges,.. . not of treatymakers").
49. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
50. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 34 ("[Flew would argue
that the authority of Congress and the President to enact law is somehow constrained by
treaties' status as supreme law of the land.").
51. See id. ("In light of the Constitution's carefully crafted checks and balances, one
might expect the ability of one set of lawmakers to override the lawmaking of another set
to receive more explicit treatment than the discretion of any given set of lawmakers to limit
the exercise of its own authority.").
52. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 210 (noting "Supremacy Clause ... does not
establish" equality of statutes and treaties); Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1499 ("[T]he
[Supremacy] Clause does not explicitly indicate that the Constitution is superior to treaties
[or] . . . the hierarchical relationship between statutes and treaties."); John T. Parry,
Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 1209, 1212, 1328-29 (2009) [hereinafter Parry, Implementation] (arguing "ambiguity,
disagreement, and debate surrounding the implementation of treaties in the early years ...
under the Constitution" showed "lack of consensus" and "considerable confusion about
how the treaty power, legislative powers, and Supremacy Clause would interact"); John T.
Parry, Rewriting the Roberts Court's Law of Treaties, 88 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 65, 76-77
(2010) [hereinafter Parry, Rewriting], at http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/
seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso65.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("[T]he [Supremacy] Clause's seemingly absolute or 'categorical' language is ambiguous
in the context of separation of powers. .. . [T] he Clause does not specify the relationship
between statutes and treaties."); Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2249-51 (noting
Supremacy Clause "fails to address the relationship of the treaty power and the legislative
power" and "does not alter the existing relationships between different types of federal
law").
53. Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2250-51.
54. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .").
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focused on the vertical status of treaties, omitting a horizontal require-
ment of equivalence.5 5
The treaty power's placement in Article II, which addresses the
President's power, is also significant.5 6 Unlike Article I, Article II does
not expressly speak of legislative power.5 7 Thus, unlike the Constitution
and statutes, treaties would appear to be, foremost, instruments of for-
eign affairs rather than of domestic lawmaking. This contextual differ-
ence may justify differential domestic treatment.5 8
Looking beyond the text and context of the Supremacy Clause to its
purpose also indicates that treaties need not receive equivalent treat-
ment. The Constitution and statutes were included in the Supremacy
Clause to secure the domestic lawmaking supremacy of the federal gov-
ernment in areas of delegated authority. Treaties, by contrast, were not
included to secure another avenue of supreme domestic lawmaking, but
to secure federal foreign affairs supremacy.5 9 The states had demon-
55. Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 147; Moore, Law(makers) of the Land,
supra note 29, at 34; cf. Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2249-51 (arguing
Supremacy Clause is "federalism provision" and not "separation of powers provision").
56. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 1966 ("The
Treaty Clause's location suggests that treaties are executive, rather than legislative, in
nature."); Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2234 ("By its placement in Article
II, . . . treatymaking is clearly an executive power.").
57. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527-28 (2008) (explaining President's
Article II power to make treaties does not include power to make law by "unilaterally ...
giv[ing] the effect of domestic law to obligations under a non-self-executing treaty");
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) ("[T]he President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker."). Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress . . . ."), and id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress "[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States"), with id. art.
II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed...."). But cf.
Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1508-12 (noting, inter alia, Article II includes powers typically
associated with Executive, including powers to recommend legislation or to enter
agreements with foreign nations, that partake of legislative or foreign affairs authority
rather than purely power to execute law).
58. Cf. infra Part II.C (defending differential treatment of treaties given treaties' dual
role as foreign affairs instruments and domestic law).
59. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 199 ("[The Supremacy C]lause [was] designed
principally to assure the supremacy of treaties to state law . . . ."); Bradley, Treaty Duality,
supra note 6, at 144-47 ("Almost everyone agrees that the inclusion of treaties in the
Supremacy Clause was a response to a specific problem under the Articles of
Confederation, which is that the Articles did not give the national government sufficient
authority to ensure state compliance with treaty obligations."); Bradley & Goldsmith,
Conditional Consent, supra note 16, at 448-49 ("[T]he Framers wished to give the
national government the power to prevent treaty violations by U.S. states if they so
desired."); Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1512 ("Statutes are intended to regulate domestic
conduct, whereas treaties regulate domestic conduct only because that is the 'price paid'
for promoting national interests with foreign nations."); Moore, Law(makers) of the Land,
supra note 29, at 33 ("[T]he Supremacy Clause was adopted to restrict the sort of
subnational treaty compliance that plagued the country during the period of
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strated a propensity to disregard treaties, particularly the Treaty of Peace
with Britain, leading to serious foreign affairs problems for the United
States.6 0 Treaties were listed in the Supremacy Clause in response.6 1
While inclusion resulted in treaties becoming domestic law (though not
always judicially enforceable domestic law),62 treaties were included on
the understanding that they were primarily foreign relations tools that
should appear in the Supremacy Clause to ensure federal management of
foreign affairs.6 3 To the extent that non-self-execution turns, for exam-
ple, on treatymaker intent, it appears consistent with the purpose behind
inclusion in a way that similar treatment of the Constitution and statutes
might not.6 4
Confederation[] . . . not ... to address the scope of the federal treatymakers' authority to
control the domestic implementation of treaty duties." (footnote omitted)); Yoo,
Globalism, supra note 24, at 1964, 1978-80 ("Both the text of the Supremacy Clause and its
history indicate that its primary purpose was to guarantee the primacy of federal law over
state law.").
60. See, e.g., Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 144 (noting states had passed
laws conflicting with 1783 Treaty of Peace, resulting in Great Britain's refusal to fulfill
treaty duty to remove troops); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695, 698-99 (1995) [hereinafter Vzquez, Four
Doctrines] ("Among the pressing problems of the period of the Articles of Confederation
were the repeated violations by the states of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.");
Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 605-06, 617-19, 621, 642
("Congress had concluded a number of treaties, most importantly the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain, but the states violated them, causing significant problems for the fledgling
nation." (footnote omitted)); Sloss, Self-Execution Debate, supra note 17 ("The Framers of
the Constitution included treaties in the text of the Supremacy Clause to address ... [the]
problem . . . [of] judges in state courts . . . refusing to enforce Article IV of the Peace
Treaty with Great Britain.").
61. See supra note 60 (describing state violations of treaty obligations as motivating
treaties' inclusion in Supremacy Clause).
62. But cf. Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 491 n.46 (documenting
ambiguity Medellin introduced regarding whether non-self-executing treaties are merely
judicially unenforceable or not domestic law).
63. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 146-47 ("[T]he entire thrust of the
adoption of the Supremacy Clause was one of empowering the national government to
operate more effectively. . . . The Supremacy Clause simply ensures that in the United
States [decisions regarding treaty compliance] rest[ ] at the federal rather than state
level."); Vlzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 605-06, 616-19 ("There
was general agreement at the Constitutional Convention that the new Constitution had to
empower the federal government to enforce treaties.").
64. The empirical observation that U.S. courts tend to enforce treaties against the
states but not against Congress or consistently against the President likewise confirms the
Supremacy Clause's federalist focus. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 147-48
("The pattern of judicial enforcement of treaties throughout U.S. history . . . comports
with a federalism rather than separation-of-powers understanding of the Supremacy
Clause."); Wu, supra note 3, at 573-75 (finding "direct treaty enforcement in U.S. courts
consists mostly of enforcement against State breach of U.S. treaty obligations"; courts do
not enforce treaties when faced with congressional breach and show varying levels of
deference when faced with executive breach); cf. Sloss, United States, supra note 18, at
534-36, 553-54 (finding non-self-execution is more common in cases against government
actors than in litigation between private parties).
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2. Treaties in Areas of Congressional Authority Are Non-Self-Executing. -
A second theory that undercuts a constitutional requirement of equiva-
lence has been offered by John Yoo. Professor Yoo posits an original in-
tent under which non-self-execution is consistent with the Supremacy
Clause because it protects Congress's assigned role as domestic lawmaker,
a role that would be infringed if treaties inevitably created domestic law.6 5
In his view, the Framers inherited and preserved a distinction between
the power to make treaties and the power to legislate.6 6 This fact has
gone unappreciated in part because proponents of self-execution have
focused inordinately on the workings of the Constitutional Convention.67
The Constitutional Convention excluded the House of Representatives
from treatymaking on the ground that the House was ill-suited to the
secrecy and dispatch often required in treaty negotiation.6 8 The
Convention likewise adopted a Supremacy Clause that included treaties
among the sources of supreme federal law while rejecting Madison's pro-
posal that Congress deal with state treaty violations through legislation
negating state laws.6 9
While these developments have been cited to support treaty self-
execution, Yoo maintains that proponents of self-execution neglect the
more important evidence from the state ratifying conventions where the
authority to approve the Constitution was actually exercised. 70 In those
conventions, constitutional critics cited the exclusion of the House from
treatymaking.7 1 "When initial responses that the House was ill-suited for
diplomacy did not seem to gain traction, leading Federalists fell back" on
the distinction between treaty and lawmaking powers, "downplayed the
65. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 1961-62. Not only would self-execution allow
treatymakers to exercise legislative power, but it might allow treatymakers to evade
constitutional restraints that apply to legislation, resulting in superior treatment of the
treatymaking power. Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2237-39, 2242. Self-
execution would also infringe on the political branches' supremacy in foreign affairs. Id.
at 2248.
66. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 1961-62, 1986-2027, 2040-56, 2058-59,
2063-66, 2071-74, 2078-86, 2091-94; see also Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at
2223 ("[T]he Framers saw a tension between the Supremacy Clause's efforts to make
treaties binding on the nation . .. and Article I's vesting of all federal legislative power in
Congress.").
67. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 2037-40, 2069-70 (disputing
internationalists' conclusions from Constitutional Convention and focus on Convention
which "had no official authority to make the decisions that gave the Constitution its
political legitimacy" (citing Paust, Self-Executing, supra note 41, at 761-62; Vizquez,
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 18, at 1097-110)).
68. See id. at 2025-39 ("[T]he Convention . . . reject[ed] a treatymaking role for the
House .. . because [it] concluded that [the House] was structurally unsuited for the task of
conducting diplomacy.").
69. See id. at 2026-39 ("[T]he Convention did select the Supremacy Clause approach
over Madison's more aggressive effort to place the federal government in the position of a
state legislature of last resort.").
70. Id. at 2039-40; Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2222, 2231-32.
71. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 2025, 2040.
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Supremacy Clause," and explained that the federal government would
implement treaties through legislation.7 2 Based on this evidence, Yoo
concludes that treaties should be non-self-executing if they address mat-
ters within Congress's legislative powers,7 3 or, second best, that treaties be
presumed non-self-executing absent a clear statement to the contrary.74
3. The Three Tiers Hypothesis. - Vasan Kesavan advances a third the-
ory against a constitutional requirement of equivalence. Kesavan argues,
based on the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, that "statutes
are superior to treaties."7 5 Textually, the Constitution appears first in the
Supremacy Clause, followed by statutes, then treaties.76 Structurally, stat-
utes have a stronger democratic pedigree as their enactment involves all
three actors in the political branches, including the House of
Representatives, the organ most representative of the people.7 7 And con-
stitutional structure manifests a presumption of hierarchy rather than co-
equality in situations of overlapping authority.7 8 Federal courts and state
courts as well as Congress and state legislatures possess concurrent au-
thority, but the Supreme Court controls the interpretation of federal law
and Congress may preempt state law.79 This supremacy principle places a
"thumb on the scale[ ] against the notion of co-supremacy of the lawmak-
ing and treaty-making powers."8 0
History likewise supports a hierarchical relationship between statutes
and treaties. In eighteenth-century British practice, some treaties-
including "those involving matters of revenue and conflicts with existing
72. Id. at 2025, 2040, 2073.
73. Id. at 2093.
74. See id. ("At the very least, courts should obey the presumption that when the text
of a treaty is silent, courts ought to assume that it is non-self-executing."); Yoo, Public
Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2219-20, 2255-56 ("Under the 'soft' rule [of non-self-
execution], courts can remain true to the text, structure, and original understanding of
the Constitution by requiring the treatymakers to issue a clear statement if they want a
treaty to be self-executing."). For responses to Professor Yoo's thesis, see Martin S.
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as
"Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2095 (1999) (arguing "careful
[historical] examination of the self-execution assumption" confirms Founders "intended
treaties to be self-executing ... without implementing legislation"); Vazquiz, Laughing at
Treaties, supra note 13, at 2154 (asserting that treaties are presumptively self-executing
and "constitutional text, doctrine, and structure-to say nothing of the Founders' intent-
rule out Professor Yoo's claim that all or most treaties categorically or presumptively lack
the force of domestic law"); see also Henkin, supra note 13, at 203 n.103 (rejecting Yoo's
thesis prior to Yoo's article). For Professor Yoo's reply, see Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra
note 34, at 2218 (responding to Professors Flaherty and Vdzquez "by advancing textual and
structural constitutional arguments in defense of the doctrine of non-self-executi[on]").
75. Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1486.
76. Id. at 1500-01.
77. Id. at 1612-15.
78. See id. at 1615-16 ("There is no constitutional basis for a notion of co-supremacy
among overlapping powers granted to different actors.").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1616.
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statutes"-required parliamentary "participation in order to take effect as
a matter of domestic law."81 Of the few Framers who addressed British
practice during the Philadelphia Convention, the majority "understood
British practice to require non-self-execution in the specific case of stat-
ute-treaty conflict" and "presumably [and in some cases clearly] thought
that this limitation would apply to the Constitution."8 2 In the debates
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the shared understanding
seemed to be that Article II treaties generally would be self-executing, an
arrangement the Anti-Federalists opposed.8 3 There was some recogni-
tion, however, that certain treaties would require implementation, possi-
bly including treaties that would conflict with existing laws.8 4 The issue
was addressed in greater detail in certain state ratifying conventions.8 5
The state debates manifest an understanding of general self-execution
with an exception, consistent with British practice, for treaties that con-
flict with present statutes.86 Fast-forwarding to the contemporary, the
three tiers thesis is substantially consistent with the way the last-in-time
rule has been applied to trump prior treaties rather than prior statutes as
well as with the modern dominance of congressional-executive agree-
ments, the judicial tendency to presume non-self-execution, and the
treatymakers' practice of attaching declarations of non-self-execution.8 7
While Kesavan's primary target ostensibly is the last-in-time rule,8 8
the three tiers thesis expressly undermines the equivalence thesis as
well.89 As Kesavan explains: "If statutes are superior to treaties ... then
treaties that conflict with statutes must be non-self-executing."9 0 Other
types of treaties may also be non-self-executing but the three tiers thesis
81. Id. at 1524-25.
82. Id. at 1540.
83. Id. at 1559-60.
84. Id. at 1560.
85. Id. at 1561.
86. Id.; see also id. at 1564-92 (discussing debates in Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Virginia, and North Carolina). Kesavan also addresses "early post-Founding history," which
he concludes "neither supports nor weakens the partial non-self-execution thesis to any
material extent." Id. at 1594; see also id. at 1592-612 (discussing post-Founding evidence).
87. See id. at 1618-29, 1633-34 ("[M]odern practice soundly resonates with the three
tiers of federal law thesis and the partial non-self-execution thesis, two sides of the same
coin.").
88. Id. at 1485, 1633.
89. See, e.g., id. at 1489, 1498 ("Under the [three tiers] thesis, treaties must be non-
self-executing when they conflict with existing statutes.").
90. Id. at 1488; see also id. at 1486, 1489, 1503 (describing non-self-execution that
results from three tiers thesis). Kesavan recognizes one possible exception. Based on the
particular separation of powers regarding war and peace and arguments from necessity,
Kesavan recognizes that peace treaties might displace prior inconsistent statutes. Id. at
1616-18.
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minimally requires non-self-execution for treaties that conflict with ex-
isting laws.9 1
C. The Dual Nature of Treaties justifies Non-Self-Execution
A final argument against constitutional equivalence focuses on treaty
duality. Treaties not only function as domestic law, they also play a role
in foreign relations.9 2 Indeed, they are primarily instruments of foreign
affairs and secondarily domestic law. A treaty cannot exist without con-
sent from a foreign sovereign. Thus, even when treaties address and
might affect arguably domestic matters like human rights, they are ini-
tially and always pacts between sovereigns. As noted above, the inclusion
of treaties in Article II, rather than in Article I, highlights the interna-
tional nature of treaties. Article II addresses executive power and does
not speak expressly of legislative authority.9 3
The dual view of treaties has also been confirmed by the Supreme
Court. In the Head Money Cases, for example, the Court explained that
"[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations."9 4 How-
ever, "a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights"
that are enforceable among private parties.9 5 The Supremacy Clause
"places such provisions . . . in the same category as other laws of
Congress."9 6
91. E.g., id. at 1489 (noting non-self-execution required by three tiers thesis "is to be
added to other cases where non-self-execution is properly required as a matter of text,
history, and structure").
92. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 133, 182 (noting that treaties' dual
political and legal nature, including treaties' "status within international law, and
potentially also within domestic law"); see also Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra
note 29, at 40 ("Treaties give rise to obligations to and from coequal sovereigns. At the
same time, the Constitution assigns treaties a domestic function."); Yoo, Globalism, supra
note 24, at 1958, 1970-71 (noting "process and objectives of treatymaking are quite
different from other forms of public lawmaking" and that treaty violations are political in
nature); Young, supra note 11, at 95 ("Treaties have a dual existence; they are part of
international law and, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, simultaneously part of the 'the
supreme Law of the Land.'" (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2)).
93. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (enumerating executive powers); Yoo, Globalism, supra
note 24, at 1966 ("The Treaty Clause's location suggests that treaties are executive, rather
than legislative in nature."); Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2234 (noting
notwithstanding fact that "Constitution does not embody a pure separation of powers,"
"[b]y its placement in Article II, . . . treatymaking is clearly an executive power"); supra
notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing treaty power's placement in Constitution).
But cf. Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1508-12 (noting, inter alia, Article II includes powers
typically associated with executive but not purely executive in nature, such as power to
recommend legislation or to enter agreements with foreign nations).
94. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent
nations.").
95. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
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A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, when-
ever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that
court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case
before it as it would to a statute.9 7
Thus, treaties are primarily international agreements but may also, under
certain circumstances, provide rules of decision for U.S. courts.
Scholars favoring self-execution resist the characterization of treaties
as primarily international, at least to the extent that this characterization
leads to a reduced domestic role for treaties.9 8 Notwithstanding this op-
position, the Supreme Court in Medellin reaffirmed as self-evident the ob-
servation that a treaty's primary role is international.9 9 This observation
is buttressed by the fact that, as the Court noted, treaty provisions that are
non-self-executing and therefore unenforceable by domestic courts re-
main binding internationally.10 0 They continue to play their primary role
even when they are unenforceable in their secondary, domestic dimen-
97. Id. at 598-99.
98. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 158-59 (noting "proponents of
presumptive self-execution understandably bristle when courts ... quote from the Head
Money Cases for the proposition that '[a] treaty is primarily a compact between
independent nations'" where "the Court further observed in that case that 'a treaty may
also contain provisions . . . which partake of the nature of municipal law and which are
capable of judicial] enforcement as between private parties'" (quoting Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. at 598)); VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 602-06
(rejecting notion that treaties are primarily compacts whose enforcement depends "on the
interest and honor of the" parties by arguing "Supremacy Clause . . . supplements
international law mechanisms for enforcing treaties by adding domestic mechanisms"
thereby "assimilat[ing] treaties to federal statutes and the Constitution" (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 548
U.S. 557 (2006))).
99. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) ("A treaty is, of course, 'primarily a
compact between independent nations."' (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598)); see
also Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 180-81 (discussing ways in which Court took
account of treaties' dual nature).
100. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504 ("[While n]o one disputes that [the relevant ICJ
judgment] constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United
States[,] . . . not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal
law enforceable in U.S. courts." (emphasis omitted)); id. at 505 ("[W]hile treaties 'may
comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has
either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
"self-executing" and is ratified on these terms.'" (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc))); id. at 520 ("[A] judgment of an
international tribunal might not automatically become domestic law [but it] would still
constitute [an] international obligation[ ], the proper subject of political and diplomatic
negotiations."); id. at 522-23 ("[W]hile the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an
international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force
constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state [habeas law]."); id. at 536 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Even though [the Avena judgment] is not 'the supreme Law of the Land,'
no one disputes that it constitutes an international law obligation . . . ." (quoting U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2)).
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sion, whereas the reverse is not true; a treaty that has been dissolved inter-
nationally would not constitute domestic law.'o"
Treaties' dual nature as instruments of foreign affairs and domestic
law produces a variety of differences between statutes and treaties, as
Curtis Bradley has noted. First, treaties often use broad terminology to
extract consent from global diversity. 102 This terminology and the con-
cepts it reflects may not readily cohere with U.S. law, the operation of the
U.S. legal system, or typical U.S. terminology, "even when the policies of
the treat[y] are otherwise [consistent] with U.S. law."1 0 3 Second, because
treaties are drafted in a decentralized international regime comprised of
diverse legal orders, they are less likely than statutes to anticipate judicial
enforcement, particularly judicial enforcement through domestic
courts.1 0 4 Third, treaties are a mix of contract and law.105 Their contrac-
tual character arises from the fact that treaties record commitments be-
tween states.1 0 6 In their contractual dimension, treaties "implicate con-
siderations of international politics and diplomacy, considerations that
are particularly the domain of the Executive Branch," leaving the
Executive a greater role in treaty interpretation and termination than in
statutory interpretation and termination.1 07 Fourth, treaties engage less
of the democratic process than statutes as they require the participation
of only one house of Congress and principally, if not exclusively, at the
ratification rather than negotiation stage.10 8 These differences, the argu-
ment goes, justify differential treatment and, in particular, less judicial
enforcement of treaties than is afforded statutes-notwithstanding the
Supremacy Clause's crude lumping of the Constitution, statutes, and
treaties. 0 9
101. An implementing statute may continue in force after a treaty has dissolved, but
the treaty itself would not be domestic law. Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 111 cmt. h (1987) (explaining when non-self-
executing treaty is implemented, "strictly, it is the implementing legislation, rather than
the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States").
102. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 158 ("[T]he need to find common
ground among countries with widely varied legal systems, cultures, and preferences often
results in a lack of linguistic precision.").
103. Id. at 157-58.
104. Id. at 158; see also id. at 180 (discussing Supreme Court's observation "that the
requirement of compliance with ICJ decisions was situated within an international legal
system that emphasized political rather than judicial enforcement").
105. Id. at 158-59.
106. See id. at 158 ("Treaties inherently involve contractual commitments to other
nations . . . .").
107. Id.; see also id. at 180-82 (noting concern about "undermining political branch
management of foreign relations" when enforcing treaties domestically as well as "long-
standing doctrine of deference to Executive Branch treaty constructions").
108. Id. at 159; see also id. at 181 (noting enforcement of ICJ judgments raised
Supreme Court concern for "democratic process and sovereignty").
109. See id. at 132-33, 157, 182 (discussing differences between treaties and statutes
that justify different judicial treatment); see also Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra
note 29, at 40-41 ("Given treaties' dual character, it is not clear that a doctrine that
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III. AN EXPANDED DuALiTY
The dual nature of treaties, upon which this final argument relies,
has been widely acknowledged and is not particularly controversial or re-
futable.' 10 The controversy results from reliance on treaty duality to un-
dercut the equivalence thesis and support non-self-execution. 111 Resis-
tance to the notion that treaty duality supports non-self-execution rests
on the fact that the Supremacy Clause identifies treaties as a source of
domestic law notwithstanding the international role that treaties play.112
British practice perceived treaties primarily as tools of international rela-
tions; they only became domestic law through an act of Parliament.' 13
The United States opted for a different arrangement. 114 Through
the Supremacy Clause, the United States gave treaties a role in
domestic law.1 15 Critics of non-self-execution thus assert that treaties'
dual nature should not affect treaties' domestic status.11 6 Under-
inquires into whether the external exercise of [treatymaking] authority is to be given the
domestic effect the Supremacy Clause permits is inconsistent with the pairing of treaties
with statutes and the Constitution.").
110. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (recognizing treaties
are both international compacts and, if self-executing, like legislative enactments);
Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1512 ("Statutes are intended to regulate domestic conduct,
whereas treaties regulate domestic conduct only because that is the 'price paid' for
promoting national interests with foreign nations."); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at
1958 ("Although, like statutes and the Constitution, treaties are supreme over inconsistent
state law, the process and objectives of treatymaking are quite different from other forms
of public lawmaking." (footnote omitted)).
111. See supra text accompanying note 98 (rejecting reduced domestic role for
treaties due to treaties' primarily international nature). Compare VAzquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land, supra note 13, at 605-06 (arguing although treaties are "contracts between
nations," the Supremacy Clause "supplements international law mechanisms for enforcing
treaties by adding domestic mechanisms"), with Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at
157-60 (noting dual nature of treaties explains why treaties and statutes receive different
judicial treatment).
112. See VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 605-06, 616-19
(arguing purpose and original meaning of Supremacy Clause dictate equivalent treatment
of statutes and treaties despite treaties' international dimension).
113. Id. at 614-15.
114. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("In the United
States a different principle is established."); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra
note 13, at 616 ("The [Supremacy Clause] . . . represented a clear break from the British
approach.").
115. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (noting
that treaties are "to be regarded . . . as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever
[they] operate[ ] ... without the aid of any legislative provision"); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land, supra note 13, at 613-19 (explaining Supremacy Clause gave treaties effect as
domestic law).
116. See Vzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism, supra note 6, at 1612-13 ("The
Constitution takes the international obligations created by our treaties and gives them the
force of domestic law, thus implicitly directing all law-applying officials to apply them as
they do other forms of law."); VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at
605-06, 616-19 (arguing "[the Constitution] assimilates treaties to federal statutes and the
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lying this argument is a sensitivity to an exclusive focus on treaty
duality.1 17
This Essay accommodates that concern, at least partially, by taking
treaty duality only as a starting point. The Essay goes further to intro-
duce, and build on, the duality of the Constitution and statutes. Given
the inordinate focus on treaty duality, the dual nature of the Constitution
and statutes has been overlooked in the self-execution debate. Many
have noted that "treaties are different from the Constitution and statutes.
Treaties serve an external role that the Constitution and statutes do not.
Treaties give rise to obligations to and from coequal sovereigns."118
These observations, while true, neglect other important considera-
tions. First, statutes can also give rise to obligations to and from coequal
sovereigns. In fact, the United States enters international agreements
through the process of bicameralism and presentment far more often
than it does through the Article II treaty process.119 Of course, these
agreements do not become binding internationally through that process
alone. The President must complete the process provided in the agree-
ment for expressing consent. The key point, however, is that the normal
statutory process may also be invoked in the course of creating interna-
tional obligations. Second, in addition to creating specific obligations,
treaties play a more general role in international relations. 120 As
Professor Bradley has observed, "every treaty is a contract that implicates
the U.S. relationship with one or more other nations, and such a relation-
ship inherently includes political as well as legal elements, such as consid-
erations of reciprocity, reputation, and national interest."12 1 Third, and
critically for this Essay, treaties are not the only source of law that affects
international affairs.
Statutes affect foreign relations in many ways. At one extreme, stat-
utes applied within U.S. territory can have foreign relations impacts even
when applied to U.S. nationals. Statutes of this type might include the
Constitution, thus obviating the differences in enforcement mechanisms that would
otherwise exist" given treaties' role as international contracts).
117. See VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 602-06
(acknowledging treaties possess dual nature but rejecting conclusion that they should
therefore receive different treatment). But see Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at
157-60 ("[TI here are important differences between statutes and treaties[, stemming from
treaties' dual nature,] that are relevant to judicial enforceability, and these differences
suggest less of a judicial role for enforcing treaties than for statutes . . . .").
118. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 40; see also Bradley, Treaty
Duality, supra note 6, at 159 ("[U]nlike statutes, treaties operate not only within the
domain of law, but also within the domain of international politics.").
119. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1258 tbl.1, 1260 tbl.2
(2008) (identifying 375 Article II treaties and 2,744 congressional-executive agreements
between 1980 and 2000); Kesavan, supra note 44, at 1625-26.
120. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 133 (describing treaties' operation
within both "domain of international politics as well as within the domain of law").
121. Id.
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federal death penalty, which generates opposition from abolitionist coun-
tries.122 Indeed, in extradition treaties with the United States, many
states ensure that extradition is not required if the United States seeks
capital punishment.1 2 3 Other statutes have an even more direct impact:
namely, statutes that specifically target foreign nationals-such as immi-
gration laws' 2 4-or that authorize or command foreign actions by U.S.
officials.1 25
122. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2006); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on national
origin). Even statutes that govern the domestic decisionmaking procedures of federal
agencies can have extraterritorial effects. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d
528, 529-33, 536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting extraterritorial impact of applying National
Environmental Policy Act, with its requirement of environmental impact assessment, to
National Science Foundation's domestic decision to incinerate waste at research facility in
Antarctica).
123. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, U.S.-Swed., art. VIII, Oct. 24, 1961, 14
U.S.T. 1845 ("If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the law of the requesting State and the law of the requested State does not permit
this punishment, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State gives such
assurance as the requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be
carried out.").
124. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889)
(invoking federal control over foreign affairs in finding federal government may exclude
aliens from United States); Ginger Thompson, Mexican President Thanks Bush for
Support on Changes in Immigration, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2006, at A9 (noting Mexican
President's effort to promote United States immigration reform); Calderon to Congress:
Pass Immigration Reform, CBS News (May 20, 2010), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2010/05/20/world/main6502952.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
Mexican President's call for U.S. immigration reform); Charley Keyes, U.S., Cuba Set to
Talk About Immigration Issues, CNN Political Ticker (June 13, 2010), at
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/13/u-s-cuba-set-to-talk-about-immigration-
issues/?fbid=JJMKbvxSlgy (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing implications
for United States-Cuba relations of changes in U.S. immigration law); cf. Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430-32 (1968) (striking down Oregon statute regulating inheritance
rights of nonresident aliens); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 339-40, 343 (1924)
(striking down Seattle ordinance that both prohibited unlicensed operation of pawn
brokerage and denied licenses to foreign nationals); Embajada de M6xico en Estados
Unidos de America, Declaracion de la Embajada de Mexico en Relacion con la Iniciativa
de Ley SB1070 en el Estado de Arizona [Statement of the Mexican Embassy in Relation to
Legal Initiative SB1070 in the State of Arizona], Apr. 15, 2010, available at
http://portal.sre.gob.mx/eua/index.php?option=news&task=viewarticle&sid=426 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (expressing Mexican government's concern over tough
immigration law Arizona was, at the time, considering and has since enacted).
125. For example, the sanctions statute involved in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council directed the President to develop a multilateral strategy to deal with the human
rights situation in Burma and gave him discretion to increase or waive sanctions in light of,
inter alia, progress or regression there. 530 U.S. 363, 368-70 (2000); cf. United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1936) (addressing constitutionality of
Joint Resolution giving President discretion to criminalize certain sales of arms to
countries involved in Chaco War). Various other statutes likewise authorize or direct the
executive branch to carry out certain acts. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 6441-6442, 6445, 6450
(2006) (directing President to respond to foreign states' religious freedom violations,
including by entering international agreements with those states, and prohibiting judicial
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Arguably, statutes that regulate not only actions at home but actions
abroad, especially the acts of foreign nationals, are prototypical of stat-
utes' secondary, foreign affairs role.1 26 Such statutes are not uncommon;
the United States has regulated foreign activity through, inter alia, anti-
trust, securities, copyright, trademark, intellectual property, bankruptcy,
tax, corporate, criminal, labor, civil rights, and environmental law.127
The extraterritorial expansion of U.S. law has, unsurprisingly, been met
with opposition from other states. 128 Foreign governments have, inter
alia, protested, refused to recognize U.S. judgments or extraterritorial
U.S. laws in judicial proceedings, ordered their citizens not to adhere to
review of relevant "Presidential determination[s] or agency action[s]"); id. § 7555
(requiring President to "formulate [and submit to various congressional committees] a 5-
year strategy for Afghanistan"); id. § 7814 (authorizing President "to increase the
availability of information inside North Korea by increasing the availability of sources of
information not controlled by the Government of North Korea"); id. § 7112(b) (directing
Secretary of Labor to "carry out [various] ... activities to monitor and combat forced labor
and child labor in foreign countries"); 22 U.S.C. § 7624 (Supp. II 2009) (authorizing
United States Agency for International Development Administrator "to strengthen the
capacity of developing countries' governmental institutions to" facilitate development and
delivery of new vaccines). An important component of these statutes addresses domestic,
rather than foreign, relations in managing the shared foreign affairs authority of the
political branches.
126. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 505, 556 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley, Territorial] (noting
"common sense notion that conflicts with foreign nations are more likely with respect to
extraterritorial applications than with respect to territorial applications" of U.S. law);
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley
J. Int'l L. 85, 115 (1998) ("[T]he surest way to avoid having more than one law apply to the
same activity is to assign prescriptive jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of where the
conduct occurs.").
127. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 815, 846-49 (2009); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) ("[O]ur courts have long held that application of our antitrust
laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is . . . reasonable, and hence consistent with
principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused."); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("[I]t is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States."); id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("We have ... found the presumption [against extraterritoriality] to be overcome with
respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially."); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279-81 & nn.1-4
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting host of American laws that apply
extraterritorially); Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 563-75, 613-83 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing history of extraterritorial
application of U.S. law); Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? 22, 93-125,
161, 164, 177-80, 227-29, 237-39 (2009) (tracking post World War II expansion of
statutory extraterritoriality).
128. Parrish, supra note 127, at 857-58, 864-65; see also Raustiala, supra note 127, at
95, 115 (noting after World War II, United States "creatively flexed its jurisdictional
muscles in what, to many of its closest allies, was an alarmingly aggressive and unilateral
fashion" that "provoked strident protests from major trading partners").
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U.S. law, and enacted clawback provisions enabling entities who incur
liability to plaintiffs under extraterritorial U.S. law to recover damages
from those plaintiffs. 129 Relatedly, the United States's extraterritorial ex-
tension of its law has motivated other countries to follow suit, producing
more domestic law that attempts to regulate the international sphere.13 0
Extraterritorial application of United States statutes has thus had a direct
impact on foreign relations.
With regard to the Constitution, a similar spectrum exists.
Constitutional limitations on domestic regulation of domestic conduct,
such as limitations on regulation of hate speech, can produce foreign
relations issues. In ratifying the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, for example, the United States entered a reser-
vation, refusing to assume an obligation to prohibit "[a]ny advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi-
nation, hostility or violence"13 ' insofar as such a prohibition would con-
travene constitutional (and statutory) free speech protections. 13 2 The
scope of government actors' constitutional authority both to make deci-
sions related to foreign affairs13 3 and to take actions outside U.S. terri-
129. See, e.g., Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 648-50 & n.83 (describing
retaliation of foreign states against extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws);
Barry E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble & Allen S. Weiner, International Law 685-702 (5th ed.
2007) (discussing how "extraterritorial application of U.S. law has long rankled foreign
governments, precipitating protests and stimulating countermeasures"); Raustiala, supra
note 127, at 115-16, 122, 125 (describing foreign reaction to American extraterritoriality);
Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law: A Postscript on Hartford
Fire Co. v. California, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 213, 215 & n.9 (1993) (describing foreign states'
enactment of "'blocking statutes' limiting the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws").
But cf. Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 683 (noting "[low incidence of foreign
objections to extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws").
130. Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 569; Raustiala, supra note 127, at 240-41;
Parrish, supra note 127, at 855-56, 874.
131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), Dec. 19, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
132. See 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992) (consenting to International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights with reservation that treaty "does not authorize or require legislation
or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States").
133. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (concluding President
lacked authority to make ICJ's Avena judgment binding federal law while recognizing
"plainly compelling" "interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna
Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating
commitment to the role of international law"); id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(recognizing same compelling interests); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting
Court's non-self-execution and presidential powers holdings "increase the likelihood of
Security Council Avena enforcement proceedings, of worsening relations with our
neighbor Mexico, of precipitating actions by other nations putting at risk American
citizens who have the misfortune to be arrested while traveling abroad, or of diminishing
our Nation's reputation abroad as a result of our failure to follow the 'rule of law'
principles that we preach"); Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-28
(1994) (refusing to strike down California's multinational corporate tax scheme
notwithstanding protests from foreign governments); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
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tory134 also bears heavily on foreign relations. The scope of constitu-
tional protections available to aliens likewise affects our relations with
others.135 Numerous foreign and international officials, for instance,
filed amicus briefs in support of the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene
v. Bush.1 36  Indeed, at the heart of the Constitution's secondary role
seems to lie the question whether constitutional limits constrain federal
conduct outside U.S. territory.' 3 7
227-34 (1942) (upholding President's authority to settle American citizens' claims against
Russia in process of recognizing Russia's new Soviet government); Made in the USA
Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing on political
question grounds challenge to constitutionality of using congressional-executive
agreement rather than Article II treaty to enter into North American Free Trade
Agreement); see also infra note 136 (noting foreign and international concern over
President's authority to hold enemy combatants at Guantanamo without habeas review).
134. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 36-38 (discussing critical nineteenth-century
question of whether Constitution authorized federal government to acquire new territory).
135. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A. in Support of
Petitioner, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1986) (No. 85-693),
1986 WL 727580, at *11-*12 (arguing if United States does not provide sufficient
constitutional protections against exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals,
other countries might assert broad jurisdiction over U.S. nationals); Brief of the American
Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom and the Confederation of British Industry
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (No. 85-693), 1986 WL
727584, at *14-*15, *17 (noting conflicts that might develop between states if foreign
nationals not provided sufficient constitutional protection from exercise of personal
jurisdiction by U.S. courts).
136. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 383 United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians
in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196), 2007
WL 4790793, at *2 ("Amici share a concern that the treatment of [the detainees] currently
falls short of [international humanitarian and human rights] standards and urge the Court
to ensure that these standards are observed in relation to [the detainees]."); Brief of Amici
Curiae Canadian Parliamentarians and Professors of Law in Support of Reversal,
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 2456943, at *2 ("The interests of the
United States and the global community are best served by an approach that hews closely
to existing standards of customary international law."); Brief of Amicus Curiae United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 2441586, at *5 ("As a matter of international law, the
United States is obliged to respect and ensure the rights set forth in the [International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] . . . with regard to these [detainees]."). Although
their advocacy understandably relied on international law, their briefs demonstrate the
foreign affairs impact of a domestic decision regarding the Constitution's application to
aliens.
137. The extent to which constitutional limits apply abroad is a separate question
from, and has generated more controversy than, the extent to which the federal
government may act abroad. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 132 (noting constitutional
powers have not been "thought to change outside the borders of the nation" while
constitutional limits have); Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 993 n.70
(explaining whether constitutional authority to take certain acts permits extraterritorial
action and whether constitutional limits on exercise of authority apply to extraterritorial
actions are separate questions and may require separate analyses). Indeed, authority to act
abroad is often assumed and scrutiny is focused on whether that authority is subject to
constitutional limitations. See Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution:
Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law 5 (1996) [hereinafter Neuman, Strangers]
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The Constitution's and statutes' effects on international and domes-
tic affairs are not completely separable. As the above examples illustrate,
domestic applications of the Constitution and statutes can impact foreign
affairs. At the same time, somewhere along the spectrum of effects a shift
occurs from primarily domestic to primarily international. As a general
rule, one might conclude that the Constitution and statutes have a do-
mestic focus, but certain applications of both sources primarily impact
foreign affairs.13 8 Wherever the shift from domestic to international oc-
curs, this Essay identifies the extraterritorial reach of statutes and of con-
stitutional limitations as the core of each source's role in foreign affairs.
IV. A NEW COMPARATIVE Axis
Given the dual nature of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties, do-
mestic judicial treatment of these sources might be compared along sev-
eral axes. Critics of non-self-execution compare the judicial treatment of
these sources in their domestic roles. 1 3 9 This assessment involves either
comparing two things (constitutional and statutory law) that do not pos-
sess a dual nature (if one is unpersuaded by the prior section) with one
(treaty law) that does, or comparing three things that have a dual nature
("Since Reid v. Covert, it has generally been recognized that the Constitution as such
'applies' wherever the government of the United States may act, and provides the source of
the federal government's authority to act there-the disputable question is whether a
particular constitutional limitation on the government's authority to act . . . includ[es]
within its prohibitions unusual categories of places or persons."); Sarah H. Cleveland,
Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 225, 240
(2010) ("[In t]he nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions addressing application
of constitutional rights abroad ... [t] he principle of territorial jurisdiction was applied, not
to address whether the United States had authority to act, but to hold that constitutional
limitations should not confine that action."). Structural limits have been accepted more
readily than individual rights limits, though the difference between these categories of
limitation may be more constructed than real. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 244-45
(noting "[b]ecause [structural provisions] determine the scope of federal power, they
apply everywhere the federal government acts" and "distinction between structural and
individual rights provisions[, though questioned by some,] ... undergirded the Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Insular Cases, and can be traced through many later judicial
decisions").
138. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (explaining
presumption against extraterritoriality is rooted in, inter alia, "the commonsense notion
that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind"); see also Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (citing Smith for this point); Small v.
United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005) (quoting Smith on this point); Bradley, Territorial,
supra note 126, at 557 ("[E]ven if Congress is more globally focused today than in the past,
there is no empirical evidence suggesting that Congress generally wishes to regulate foreign
conduct."); Dodge, supra note 126, at 112, 117-18 (concluding Smith's rationale is "the
only legitimate reason for the presumption" in part because it is empirically accurate); cf.
Neuman, Strangers, supra note 137, at 4 ("United States citizens within the borders of the
states ... [are] the core situation for which constitutional rights were created.").
139. See, e.g., Wzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 611, 613
(arguing differential judicial treatment of Constitution, statutes, and treaties violates
Supremacy Clause).
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but comparing the treatment of two sources (the Constitution and stat-
utes) in their primary function and a third (the treaty) in its secondary
function.
The latter approach is better than comparing the treatment of all
three sources in their foreign affairs applications. In the foreign affairs
arena, the relevance of constitutional limits and statutes is governed by
domestic law. While international law certainly addresses states' authority
to act in certain ways and, in particular, to apply their law outside their
borders,14 0 neither Congress in enacting statutes141 nor the
Constitution 4 2 is confined in U.S. courts by the dictates of international
law. Thus, domestic law controls the extraterritorial roles of statutes and
constitutional constraints. By contrast, the United States recognizes that
treaties, at least in their extraterritorial legal dimension, are governed by
international law, which defines such things as what qualifies as a treaty,
how treaties are formed and terminated, and rights upon breach.143 The
comparison of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their foreign af-
fairs roles thus mixes bodies of law.
Comparing judicial treatment of the Constitution, statutes, and trea-
ties in their areas of secondary application avoids this problem. The legal
treatment of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their areas of sec-
ondary application is a matter of domestic law. 144 Granted, the applica-
140. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 402-404 (1987) (delineating scope of states' authority to prescribe their law).
141. See, e.g., id. §§ 402 cmt. i, 403 cmt. g ("[I]t is presumed that Congress does not
intend to violate international law . . . . However, when the intent of Congress to apply
United States law in particular circumstances is clear, courts and agencies will apply that
law notwithstanding any inconsistency . . . .").
142. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2004) (citing international
and foreign authorities as instructive but not controlling in interpreting Eighth
Amendment). But cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479, 502-03
(1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Charming Betsy] (citing commentators advocating role for
international law in constitutional interpretation).
143. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 1, May 23, 1969, S. Exec.
Doc. L, 92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("The present Convention applies to treaties between
States."); Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra (noting Vienna Convention "is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice"); supra note 100
and accompanying text (discussing Court's observation in Medellin that treaties and ICJ
judgments may impose obligations under international law even if domestically non-self-
executing). By contrast, domestic law addresses such things as who can exercise the treaty
power or terminate treaties on the United States' behalf. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing "whether the President may
terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional approval").
144. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-62 (2008) (analyzing, inter
alia, Framers' intent and Supreme Court precedent in fixing extraterritorial reach of
constitutional habeas); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) ("No one disputes that
the Avena decision .. . constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United
States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal
law enforceable in United States courts."); id. at 519 ("[W]hether the treaties underlying a
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tion of the Constitution in extraterritorial affairs may be controlled by the
Constitution more generally rather than by the Supremacy Clause specifi-
cally, while the extraterritorial effectiveness of statutes is presumably gov-
erned by the Supremacy Clause, but the extraterritorial application of
both statutes and the Constitution are at least governed by domestic law
rather than separate bodies of law.145 Thus, notwithstanding possible
weaknesses, there is reason for comparison along this axis.
V. TREATMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND TREATIES IN THEIR
AREAS OF SECONDARY APPLICATION
Comparison of the judicial treatment of the Constitution, treaties,
and statutes in their areas of secondary application is a timely enterprise
judgment are self-executing . . . is, of course, a matter for this Court to decide."); F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (fixing statute's
reach by reference to prescriptive comity-on assumption that "Congress ordinarily seeks
to follow" customary international law-and statute's history and purpose). Professor
Neuman has identified, in United States constitutional history, four ways of thinking about
the Constitution's reach. Neuman, Strangers, supra note 137, at 5-8. The universalist
approach-which may be grounded in the Constitution's text, its natural law foundation,
or its status as the federal government's organic document-maintains that constitutional
rights that are not expressly limited to certain peoples or locations apply to all persons and
places even though the content of the right may vary by context. Id. at 5-6. The
membership perspective extends constitutional rights to members of the social contract
reflected in the Constitution, with membership defined in different ways. Id. at 6-7. The
mutuality approach (which Professor Neuman advocates) limits constitutional restraints to
areas where the United States can apply its municipal law. Id. at 7-8. Under this
perspective, if the United States can bind certain individuals by its law, it must also follow
constitutional limits with regard to those individuals. See id. at 8, 98-100, 108-09, 188-89
("When the United States seeks to extend legal obligations to aliens abroad, the
Constitution should extend rights along with them."). Strict territoriality, which has
"prevailed . . . for most of American constitutional history," is a species of the mutuality
approach that limits municipal law to a state's territory. Id. at 7. The final paradigm,
global due process, requires a balancing of government and individual interests, whether
ad hoc or categorically, to determine the Constitution's reach. Id. at 8. This view,
associated with Justice Kennedy, prevailed in Boumediene. See id. (discussing view
"[h]istorically . . . associated with" Justice Kennedy "that, ultimately, extraterritorial
constitutional rights boil down to a single right: the right to 'global due process'"); Gerald
L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev.
259, 261, 273 (2009) [hereinafter Neuman, After Boumediene] (noting "Boumediene
confirms and illustrates the current Supreme Court's 'functional approach' to the
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights," an approach Neuman labels "global
due process"). But cf. Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, or, When Should the
Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 711-12 (2010) (agreeing Justice
Kennedy's functional approach became majority position in Boumediene, but classifying
approach as variant of what Neuman would call universalism).
145. Compare, e.g., Neuman, Strangers, supra note 137, at 75-76, 87-88 (noting
historical arguments that constitutional rights extend to United States territories under
Supremacy Clause), with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion)
(explaining constitutional rights extend extraterritorially at least in part because "[t]he
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution [and] . . . [i]t can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution" (footnote omitted)).
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as the Supreme Court has recently issued relevant opinions for each
source of law. This Part's overview of the opinions sets the stage for Part
VI's comparison of the judicial analysis of the secondary application of all
three sources, a comparison that analyzes commitment to lawmaker in-
tent, the role of functional considerations, and judicial discretion, and
reveals that treaties fare relatively well in U.S. courts even under a broad
notion of non-self-execution.
A. Constitution
The Court's most recent foray into the extraterritoriall 4 6 application
of the Constitution occurred in Boumediene v. Bush.147 In that case, the
Court considered whether petitioners-aliens detained as enemy combat-
ants at Guantanamo Bay-"have the constitutional privilege of habeas
corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the
Suspension Clause."1 48 In answering this question, the Court first looked
to original intent,149 asking whether petitioners' status as enemy aliens or
their location at Guantanamo deprived them of constitutional rights.1 5 0
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a central role for the writ of
habeas corpus.15 1 Common law sources, however, did not settle whether
the right to seek habeas would run to individuals who, like petitioners,
were deemed enemy combatants under a definition like that employed by
the government, and "held in a territory .. . over which the Government
has total military and civil control."152
Unable to find a definitive answer in the evidence of original intent,
the Court looked for other ways to assess the government's argument that
habeas rights did not reach Guantanamo because it is not sovereign terri-
tory.15 3 The Court "accept[ed] the Government's position that Cuba,
and not the United States, retains de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo
Bay," but rejected the suggestion "that de jure sovereignty is the touch-
stone of habeas corpus jurisdiction."154 Not only did that suggestion lack
common law support, but it was also inconsistent with separation of pow-
ers norms and precedent. 5 5
146. But cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (treating Guantanamo as "within
'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United States" for purpose of presumption against
extraterritoriality (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))); Raustiala,
supra note 127, at vii (describing "claim that some constitutional rights do not apply in
some American territory," such as Guantanamo, as issue of intraterritoriality).
147. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
148. Id. at 2240.
149. See id. at 2244-51 (discussing origin and history of writ of habeas corpus in
seeking Framers' intent).
150. Id. at 2244.
151. Id. at 2244-47.
152. Id. at 2248.
153. Id. at 2251.
154. Id. at 2253.
155. Id. at 2247, 2253.
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Precedent on the Constitution's extraterritorial scope is relatively
scarce as U.S. history has provided limited opportunity for the judiciary to
definitively fix "the Constitution's geographic reach."' 5 6 According to
the Court, for much of U.S. history, Congress effectively treated the
Constitution as non-self-executing outside the territory of the states. As
Congress "create [d] new territories, it guaranteed constitutional protec-
tions to the inhabitants by statute," obviating the need for the Court to fix
the Constitution's boundaries.' 5 7
156. Id. at 2253. Professor Neuman criticizes the Court's historical review of
constitutional extraterritoriality for its insufficient attention to the first century of U.S.
experience and for its sanitized perspective of the Insular Cases, which "underplay[s] the
racial element in U.S. colonialism, and overemphasiz[es] the usefulness of the doctrine in
temporary governance of a territory that would later be granted independence." Neuman,
After Boumediene, supra note 144, at 270; see also Raustiala, supra note 127, at 218
(criticizing Boumediene's "reading of history" as "somewhat tendentious"). For a more
fulsome account of the U.S. experience with extraterritoriality, both constitutional and
statutory, see id. at 31-247.
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253; cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 275 (1990) (holding any restrictions on searches and seizures of property owned by
nonresident alien in foreign country "must be imposed by the political branches" rather
than by Fourth Amendment). Under the conventional view, the Supreme Court's
nineteenth-century jurisprudence "established that the Constitution applied to the United
States' nonstate territories," but not beyond. Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note
37, at 984; see Neuman, Strangers, supra note 137, at 4, 72-83, 106 (discussing
geographical limits on Constitution's reach through nineteenth century). Professor
Burnett, however, argues that the nineteenth-century jurisprudence "was far more
ambiguous." Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 985; see Christina Duffy
Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 797, 804, 815-16, 819, 824-34 (2005) [hereinafter Burnett, Untied States] (discussing
Supreme Court's nineteenth-century case law on Constitution's application in territories
and noting "the status of constitutional provisions in the territories had long been a source
of confusion, and continued to be so even up to 1901"); see also Raustiala, supra note 127,
at 38-52, 57-72, 77 (discussing "nettlesome and contentious" debate over whether "the
Constitution [bound] the government within new territories"). It was unclear "how the
Constitution operated in the territories." Burnett, Untied States, supra, at 801 n.11.
Among other things:
Some organic acts required that territorial legislatures not act inconsistently with
the applicable provisions of the Constitution, while others expressly "extended"
the Constitution to a given territory, again insofar as applicable. As a result, even
those decisions applying constitutional rights in the territories usually left open
the question whether the relevant constitutional provision applied of its own
force or by legislative grace.
Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 985 (footnote omitted). And, while
Dred Scott held "that the Constitution applied of its own force in the territories," the
decision was "severely undermined" by the Civil War. Id.; see also Raustiala, supra note
127, at 232 (noting under Dred Scott United States could not "acquire new territory to rule
despotically" though "the outcome of the Civil War and the repudiation of slavery
appeared to inter Dred Scott forever"). Later cases were decided against the backdrop of
congressional extension of "the Constitution to all existing territories." Burnett,
Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 986. These cases did not always decide whether
the Constitution applied on its own to the territories and, in Burnett's view, did not leave
the question free of doubt. Id.; Burnett, Untied States, supra, at 824-34 (discussing
ambiguity regarding Constitution's application to territories).
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It was not until the United States acquired a number of distant lands,
through its annexation of Hawaii and Spain's cession of the Philippines,
Guam, and Puerto Rico, that the issue of the Constitution's application
beyond contiguous territory reached the Court.15 8 Congress discontin-
ued the practice of statutorily guaranteeing constitutional rights, leaving
the Court, in the Insular Cases,'59 to decide the extent to which "the
Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a
State."o6 0 Based on the difficulty, resulting uncertainty, and ultimate fu-
tility of applying the Constitution wholesale in territories that had differ-
ent legal systems and were not destined for statehood, the Court adopted
"the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution
applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood
but only in part in unincorporated Territories." 16 1 In unincorporated
territories, absent further strengthening of ties to the United States, only
individual constitutional rights that are fundamental apply.' 6 2 This terri-
torial incorporation principle allowed the Court to take account of practi-
cal difficulties in enforcing constitutional guarantees.' 6 3
"Practical considerations" guided the Court in later cases as well.16 4
In Reid v. Covert,165 where the Court concluded that civilian dependents
of military personnel stationed overseas were entitled to jury trial in fac-
ing capital charges, various Justices expressly endorsed the relevance of
practical considerations in addition to citizenship in deciding the extra-
territorial reach of constitutional rights.' 6 6 Reid was also significant be-
cause "it rejected the long-standing view that treaties with foreign sover-
eigns (such as status of forces agreements) determined not only the
powers the United States wielded in those foreign lands, but also the
rights the United States was bound to respect."167 Under this view, the
158. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
159. See Neuman, After Boumediene, supra note 144, at 263 n.22 (describing Insular
Cases).
160. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254.
161. Id. Professor Burnett disputes that the Insular Cases endorsed the doctrine of
territorial incorporation as understood by Boumediene and by the conventional wisdom.
Burnett, Untied States, supra note 157, at 801-02, 820-24, 836-53. Among other things,
she contests the assertion that the Constitution applied fully in incorporated territories,
noting that "every constitutional provision held inapplicable in the unincorporated
territories was also inapplicable somewhere within the boundaries of the 'United States.'"
Id. at 816. At the same time, she acknowledges that "[c]ourts at all levels have accepted
and reiterated [the conventional] understanding of the [Insular Cases] and, in so doing,
they have created a legal doctrine attributed to the Insular Cases" that "has by now become
law." Id. at 869, 870; see, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69 (discussing Insular Cases
and general rule that "[o]nly 'fundamental' constitutional rights are guaranteed to
inhabitants of [unincorporated] territories").
162. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254-55.
163. Id. at 2255.
164. Id.
165. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
166. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255-57.
167. Raustiala, supra note 127, at 242.
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Constitution was effectively non-self-executing in foreign lands until exe-
cuted by treaty. Reid concluded that the Constitution could itself be self-
executing at least under certain conditions.16
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,1 69 the Court again emphasized practical con-
siderations-"the difficulties of ordering the Government to produce ...
prisoners in a habeas corpus proceeding"-in concluding that enemy
aliens convicted of law of war violations and detained in postwar, Allied-
occupied Germany were not entitled to pursue habeas relief.170 "[A]
common thread unit[es] the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea
that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical
considerations, not formalism."'17
The Boumediene Court rejected the government's formalist sover-
eignty argument on separation of powers grounds as well. If the political
branches could avoid constitutional constraints by disclaiming formal sov-
ereignty while retaining plenary control over unincorporated territory,
they would trim the judiciary's authority to interpret and enforce the
Constitution. 172
Having disposed of the government's formalist position, the Court
engaged in a functional analysis to fix the reach of the constitutional
right to habeas.17 3 The Court identified "at least three factors ... rele-
168. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 6 ("When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen
who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens
to be in another land."); id. at 16 (rejecting notion that "agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution").
169. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
170. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
171. Id. at 2258.
172. Id. at 2258-59, 2277. But see id. at 2297-98, 2302-03, 2307 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing Court failed to grasp that limitations on constitutional right to habeas
were intended to limit judicial authority to intervene just as reach of right was intended to
limit executive's authority to detain).
173. See Neuman, After Boumediene, supra note 144, at 259, 261 ("Boumediene
confirms and illustrates the current Supreme Court's 'functional approach' to the
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights."). It appears that, given his pendular
position, Justice Kennedy was able to convert the functional approach he began to
articulate in concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez into the majority position on constitutional
extraterritoriality. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning application of "Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement" to search of "foreign home of a nonresident alien" would be "impracticable
and anomalous"); Raustiala, supra note 127, at 217-18 (arguing Boumediene is noteworthy
"for its willingness to further extend a functional approach to the geographic reach of
American law"); Neuman, After Boumediene, supra note 144, at 263-65 (noting Justice
Kennedy, through discussion of "Court's prior exploration of the Constitution's
geographic scope,... amplified the methodology he had outlined in his short concurring
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez"). But cf. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2298-307
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting Court's functional analysis of habeas's extraterritorial
reach as inconsistent with precedent, separation of powers, and original understanding
and text of Suspension Clause).
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vant" to that analysis: "(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the pris-
oner's entitlement to the writ."174
As to the first factor, petitioners were foreign nationals who con-
tested their designation as enemy combatants.17 5 They were provided
limited procedural protections in disputing that designation before
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).1 76 In regard to the second
consideration, petitioners were apprehended and detained outside sover-
eign U.S. territory, which weighed against concluding that habeas rights
attached.' 77 Nonetheless, Guantanamo is only formally non-U.S. terri-
tory.17 8 "In every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within
the constant jurisdiction of the United States."179 Finally, practical con-
siderations did not prevent extension of constitutional habeas. Finding a
constitutional right to habeas corpus "in a case of military detention
abroad" might be costly and divert military personnel.1 80 However,
"[t]he Government present[ed] no credible arguments that the military
mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts
had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims," nor were any such argu-
ments apparent in light of the complete control the United States exer-
cised over Guantanamo.' 81 The detainees, though potentially dangerous
if released, were being held "in a secure prison facility on an isolated and
heavily fortified military base" outside the combat theater.18 2 Moreover,
"[t]here [was] no indication . . . that adjudicating a habeas corpus peti-
tion would cause friction with the host government" as no Cuban court
had jurisdiction over Guantanamo personnel or detainees and the
United States did not answer to any "other sovereign for its acts on the
174. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (majority opinion); see Neuman, After Boumediene,
supra note 144, at 287 (observing both that "[t]his nonexclusive list was tailored to the
Suspension Clause and its case law, and would presumably need modification to address
other rights" and that "[t]he importance of the habeas right itself was an unlisted factor
that apparently argued in favor of broader reach").
175. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
176. Id. at 2259-60.
177. Id. at 2260.
178. See id. at 2251-53 (concluding United States "maintains de facto sovereignty
over" Guantanamo).
179. Id. at 2261; see also id. at 2252-53 (noting "uncontested fact that the United
States" exercises "complete jurisdiction and control over" Guantanamo).
180. Id. at 2261.
181. Id. But see id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Court lacks competence
"to second-guess the judgment of Congress and the President" in balancing individual
liberty and national security).
182. Id. at 2261 (majority opinion); see id. at 2262 ("The detainees ... are held in a
territory that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and
total control of our Government.").
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base" outside the terms of its lease with Cuba.1 8 3 Any practical barriers
that might arise could likely be addressed by modifying habeas proce-
dures. 184 As a result, the Court concluded that the constitutional right to
habeas protected by the Suspension Clause extended to detainees at
Guantanamo.185
Just as the Court grounded the reach of the habeas right in func-
tional considerations, the Court determined the nature of the right
through a functional analysis as well.186 First, the Court recognized that:
[I] t likely would be both an impractical and unprecedented ex-
tension ofjudicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be
available at the moment [a foreign citizen apprehended
abroad] is taken into custody. . . . [P]roper deference can be
accorded to reasonable procedures for screening and initial de-
tention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and
treatment for a reasonable period of time.... [A] relevant con-
sideration is . . . whether there are suitable alternative processes
in place to protect against the arbitrary exercise of governmen-
tal power.18 7
Similarly, the judiciary might need to craft "sensible rules for staying
habeas corpus proceedings" when exceptional domestic circumstances
prevent the government from being able to respond responsibly to
habeas petitions.1 8 8 Thus, although "requiring temporary abstention or
exhaustion of alternative remedies" was not appropriate in the Boumediene
petitioners' case (given their lengthy detentions and the lack of evidence
that the Executive faced burdens preventing response to habeas suits),
abstention and exhaustion would be proper in other circumstances.1 8 9
Second, the Court explained that "[c]ertain accommodations can be
made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on the
military without impermissibly diluting the protections of the writ."' 9 0
Such accommodations include channeling cases to the District Court for
the District of Columbia and exercising judicial discretion to accommo-
date "to the greatest extent possible" the government's "legitimate inter-
est in protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering."' 9'
183. Id. at 2261.
184. Id. at 2262.
185. Id. at 2262, 2277.
186. See id. at 2275 ("Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the
definition and reach of the [writ of] habeas corpus."); see also id. at 2286 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with majority that "'precise application [of habeas] . . . change[s]
depending upon the circumstances'" (quoting id. at 2267 (majority opinion))).
187. Id. at 2275 (majority opinion).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2276.
191. Id.; cf. id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (defending adequacy of detainees'
"right to call witnesses who are reasonably available" in CSRT proceedings as "entirely
consistent with the Government's interest in avoiding a 'futile search for evidence' that
might burden warmaking responsibilities" (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532
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Finally, "[i]n considering both the procedural and substantive stan-
dards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper def-
erence must be accorded to the political branches." 192 In contrast to
"most federal judges," officials within those branches "begin the day with
briefings that may describe new and serious threats."19 3 The Executive
must possess "substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who
pose a real danger to our security," but under our rights-protecting sepa-
ration of powers regime, the judiciary must "hear challenges to the" exer-
cise of that authority.19 4
What appears from the Court's analysis in Boumediene is an initial
effort to focus on original intent. Had original intent been clear, it may
have been controlling.195 In the absence of such clarity, the Court en-
gaged in a functional analysis that considered such things as alternative
means of protecting petitioners' rights (other than through constitu-
tional habeas), deference to the Executive (at least ostensibly), the practi-
cal consequences of recognizing habeas rights in aliens at Guantanamo,
and ways to mitigate untoward consequences. As will be seen, this analy-
sis of the Constitution's role in its area of secondary application bears
certain parallels, but also critical differences, to the treatment of the
other Supremacy Clause sources of federal law.
B. Treaties
The domestic legal status of treaties has long been a matter of de-
bate. The debate was spurred in part by the paucity of Supreme Court
precedent discussing the issue. In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court
handed down its most important decision on the domestic status of trea-
ties in roughly two hundred years, and perhaps ever.1 96 The Medellin
Court assessed whether U.S. treaty commitments in relation to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) were self-executing, rendering ICJ
judgments preemptive, judicially enforceable federal law.19 7 Endorsing a
(2004))); id. (recognizing need to balance detainee access to classified information with
national security concerns but arguing CSRT process provides more access to classified
information than ever before to an alien enemy combatant).
192. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion). But see id. at 2296 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(chiding Court's "faux deference to Congress and the President"); id. at 2296-97 (arguing
deference to Congress's views of law's constitutionality should be particularly great in
matters of military and foreign affairs and should have dictated outcome in case if
common law left constitutional reach of habeas ambiguous as majority claimed).
193. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion).
194. Id. at 2277.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 326-329 (discussing Boumediene Court's
treatment of original intent).
196. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 132 ("Medellfn v. Texas contains the
most extensive discussion of treaty self-execution in the Court's history.").
197. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008).
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broad notion of non-self-execution,19 8 the Court concluded that the rele-
vant treaty obligations were not self-executing.' 9 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused foremost on the U.S.
treatymakers' intent in ratifying the relevant treaty obligations.20 0 This
focus was most evident in the Court's concluding remark that "[n]othing
in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice
among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended
the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribu-
nal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our most fundamental
constitutional protections.' "201 It also appeared in the Court's reliance
on statements of the Executive during the senatorial consent process, 20 2
and in the Court's focus on treaty text. As the Court explained, "we have
held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that
198. Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 490-91 (arguing "fewer treaties
will be deemed self-executing" as result of Medellin).
199. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506, 513-14, 518 (holding ICJ judgment was not
automatically binding domestic law" because "none of [the relevant] treaty sources
create[d] binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation").
200. Bradley, Intent, supra note 40, at 543-45 (acknowledging Court's "mixed
signals" but arguing Medellin "is best interpreted as endorsing an intent-of-the U.S.
approach"); Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 176-79 ("The Medellin decision is ...
generally consistent with [the] claim ... that the relevant intent for self-execution is that of
U.S. treaty-makers."); Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 499 ("[T]he primary
consideration guiding the [Medellin] Court's self-execution analysis is ... the intent of the
President and Senate that adopted the treaty obligation."); Young, supra note 11, at 109
(arguing question whether treaty is self-executing after Medellin "is one of interpreting the
intent of treaty makers under any given agreement").
201. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523; see also id. at 505 (holding that treaty is self-executing
if it "conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms" (quoting
Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 508 ("'[U]ndertakes to comply' . . . [does not] indicate
that the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with
immediate legal effect in domestic courts." (emphasis omitted)); id. at 509-10
(reasoning-based on Executive's statements-that "the President and Senate were
undoubtedly aware" in ratifying U.N. Charter that United States could veto Security
Council attempts to enforce ICJ judgments); id. at 510-11 (noting "the Executive and
ratifying Senate" always regarded a Security Council veto "as an option .. . during and after
consideration of the U.N. Charter, Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute" and "there is no
reason to believe that the President and Senate signed up for" regime of automatic
enforcement in domestic courts that would undermine that option); id. at 514 (defending
reliance on treaty's text on grounds text "is ... what the Senate looks to in deciding
whether to approve the treaty"); id. at 515 (asserting Framers did not envision self-
execution as hinging "on ad hoc judgment of the judiciary without looking to the treaty
language-the very language negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate");
id. at 521 ("Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the
treaty has domestic effect."); id. at 527 ("A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one
that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its own
force."); Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 499 & n.98 (describing Medellin's
focus on intent). For some contrary indications from Medellin, see, for example, Bradley,
Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 176-77.
202. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 510.
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the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic
effect."2 0 3 Evaluating the text in question, the Court concluded that the
treaty obligation to "undertake[ ] to comply with" ICJ judgments did not
contemplate immediate judicial enforcement, but future steps by the po-
litical branches.20 4
Other factors that informed the Court's analysis did not necessarily
bear on actual intent.205 Rather, the Court relied on a variety of func-
tional considerations in constructing treatymaker intent.20 6 The conclu-
sion that the treaty's text (with its absence of imperative language and
suggestion of a range of future acts2 07 ) belied self-execution was con-
firmed by the treaty's provision of an international, nonjudicial remedy
for noncompliance.20 8 Even that remedy could be blocked through invo-
cation of the U.S. veto at the Security Council.2 09 Treating ICJ judgments
as immediately enforceable federal law would obviate the need to turn to
the Security Council and would eliminate political branch discretion to
avoid enforcement.2 1 0 The result would be the transfer of "sensitive for-
eign policy decisions" to the judiciary, where there would be no discre-
tion to ignore the judgment.2 1 1 Such a shift would contravene the consti-
tutional assignment of foreign relations to the political branches. 212
Justice Breyer's proposed multifactored, case-by-case determination
of self-execution under which a treaty might be self-executing in one con-
text but not another would effect a similar shift.2 13 It "would assign to the
courts-not the political branches-the primary role in deciding when
203. Id. at 519; see also Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 177-78 (discussing
treaty text's relevance in ascertaining U.S. treatymakers' intent).
204. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508-09 & n.5; see also id. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[TIhe words 'undertakes to comply' . . . are most naturally read as a promise to take
additional steps to enforce ICJ judgments.").
205. Cf. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, at 711 (suggesting consideration of
factors like those Medell(n consulted produces "a purely constructive intent (which is to say,
no[ ] intent at all)").
206. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 45 (noting Medellin
Court's search for actual intent "was also guided by separation of powers judgments").
207. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508-09 & n.5; see also id. at 534 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[T]he best reading of the words 'undertakes to comply' is . .. one that contemplates
future action by the political branches.").
208. Id. at 509 (majority opinion); cf. Young, supra note 11, at 124-25 (doubting
treatymakers consistently desire self-execution when treaty delegates authority to
international institution).
209. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 509.
210. Id. at 510.
211. Id. at 511.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 515-16; see Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 490-91
("[G]iven his focus on the objective, contextual character of the treaty[, . . .Justice Breyer
arguably gives the judiciary greater discretion than does the majority with regard to the
domestic status of treaties . . . ."); Parry, Implementation, supra note 52, at 1333-34
(characterizing Justice Breyer's jurisprudence as giving judges "broad case-by-case policy-
making power").
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and how international agreements will be enforced."2 14 To allow the ju-
diciary to decide that a treaty sometimes creates domestic law and some-
times does not would essentially "vest[ ] with the judiciary the power not
only to interpret but also to create the law."215
The constitutional division of authority that led the Court to reject
this realignment of power motivated the Court in two other respects as
well. It led the Court to reject Justice Breyer's court-centered approach
for the additional reason that the uncertainty it would create with regard
to self-execution "could hobble the United States' efforts to negotiate and
sign international agreements."2 1 6 It likewise motivated the Court's ob-
servation that the Executive's "interpretation of a treaty 'is entitled to
great weight.' "217 The Executive had unfailingly maintained that the per-
tinent treaty obligations were non-self-executing. 218
Other states had treated ICJ judgments in the same way. The briefs
identified no "nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic
courts. "219 The practical consequences of deviating from this shared
practice gave the Court pause. 220 Mexico had asked the ICJ to annul
convictions and sentences corrupted by U.S. violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. 221 While the ICJ ordered only "re-
view and reconsideration" of those convictions and sentences, 222 the
Court noted that if ICJ judgments were unassailable federal law, the ICJ
could preempt state and federal law without resistance from U.S.
courts. 223
All these considerations led the Court to conclude that the
treatymakers who approved the nation's obligations to the ICJ did not
intend those obligations to be self-executing. As discussed more fully be-
low, the Court's analysis centered on treatymaker intent, informed by
functional considerations that served to maintain political branch
supremacy in lawmaking and foreign affairs. 224
214. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 516; see also id. at 518 (suggesting dissent's recognition that
some politically sensitive ICJ judgments should not be treated as self-executing should have
guided dissent to narrower role for judiciary in identifying self-execution); id. at 534-35
(Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
215. Id. at 516 (majority opinion).
216. Id. at 515-16.
217. Id. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85
(1982)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 516.
220. Id. at 517-18.
221. Id. at 497-98.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 518.
224. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Surrendering the Rule of Law in Foreign Relations, 32
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1154, 1155, 1159-61 (2009) (lamenting Medellin's transfer of power to
political branches, particularly Executive).
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C. Statutes
The uncertainty that has dogged self-execution analysis is not
unique. There has long been uncertainty regarding how to ascertain the
extraterritorial reach of statutes. Despite divergent views in the literature
and even in Court precedent, two relatively recent cases arguably provide
a general framework: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California225 and F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 22 6 each of which addressed ap-
plication of statutes beyond U.S. borders. 227
Hartford Fire involved allegations that foreign and domestic partici-
pants in the insurance industry had conspired to manipulate the U.S.
market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 228 The Court fractured
in identifying the issues presented in the relevant portion of the case.
The majority, led byJustice Souter, concluded that "[t]he parties do not
question [either] prescriptive jurisdiction" 229 -they conceded that the
Sherman Act applied to their conduct-or the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.2 3 0 Rather, the defendants argued that "the District Court
should have declined to exercise [subject matter] jurisdiction under the
principle of international comity." 23 1 The majority, therefore, focused its
opinion on the propriety of comity-inspired abstention.2 3 2
At the same time, the majority recognized that the question of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction precedes the question whether comity counsels ab-
stention.2 33 According to the majority, "concerns of comity"-the rea-
sonableness considerations Justice Scalia invoked in his extraterritoriality
analysis in dissent-"come into play, if at all, only after a court has deter-
mined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion."2 3 4 The majority therefore quickly noted that the Sherman Act ap-
plied to the reinsurers' foreign conduct as "it is well established by now
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to pro-
duce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."23 5
225. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
226. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
227. For a history of statutory extraterritoriality in the United States, see generally
Raustiala, supra note 127, at 93-125.
228. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 769-70.
229. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a state's authority to apply its law to a given
situation. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 401(a)
(1987).
230. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.22; see id. at 795 ("[T]he District Court
undoubtedly had jurisdiction of these Sherman Act claims, as the [defendants] apparently
concede.").
231. Id. at 797.
232. Id. at 795-99.
233. Id. at 797 n.24; see Alford, supra note 129, at 220-21 (noting "court must first
determine whether it has statutory jurisdiction ... and only then consider whether to"
abstain based on international comity).
234. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797 n.24.
235. Id. at 796 & n.22.
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The statement suggests that an intentional domestic effects test gov-
erns questions of statutory extraterritoriality.2 3 6 That conclusion is sus-
pect for several reasons, however. The quick conclusion that jurisdiction
existed was, in the majority's view, supported by the concession of the
parties and was not at issue.2 37 And the Court clearly tagged as dicta the
suggestion that jurisdiction arises solely from effects. 238 More signifi-
cantly, the Court's subsequent opinion in Hoffmann-La Roche invoked
principles of prescriptive comity in ascertaining the extraterritorial reach
of statutory proscriptions.2 3 9 The Court reasoned, not that domestic ef-
fects immediately justify extraterritorial application of a statute, but that
"application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is ...
reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity,
insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury
that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused."24 0 That is, domestic
effects play a role in the comity analysis that informs extraterritoriality;
they do not establish extraterritoriality. The Hartford Fire majority's pass-
ing suggestion that domestic effects themselves warrant extraterritoriality
is thus a shaky foundation on which to construct the Court's views on
statutory reach.
The surer foundation comes from the dissent. While the majority
saw the principal issue as abstention, Justice Scalia perceived the case very
differently. In his view, the case turned on a question of prescriptive ju-
risdiction: whether certain claims against foreign defendants "constitute
an inappropriate extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act."24 1
Consequently, the dissent alone fully analyzed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. statutes.24 2
236. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 658 ("Hartford Fire embraced a relatively
expansive effects test . . . ."); Dodge, supra note 126, at 100 (reading Hartford Fire to
"suggest that acts of Congress are presumed to apply to conduct that causes effects in the
United States").
237. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 795, 796 n.22, 797 n.24; see Born & Rutledge, supra
note 127, at 670 ("Almost all the defendants in Hartford Fire conceded that the Sherman
Act applied to their conduct, thereby granting the district court . . . [prescriptive]
jurisdiction.").
238. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797 n.24 ("[T]he parties conceded jurisdiction at
oral argument, and we see no need to address [the] . . . contention" "that comity concerns
figure into the ... analysis whether jurisdiction exists under the Sherman Act." (citation
omitted)).
239. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
("[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations."); see also infra text accompanying notes
293-302 (describing application of prescriptive comity in Hoffmann-La Roche).
240. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 165.
241. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 796 n.22
(majority opinion) ("Justice Scalia believes that what is at issue in this litigation is
prescriptive . . . jurisdiction.").
242. The fact that the dissent, but not the majority, referenced the presumption
against extraterritoriality has led some to conclude that the Supreme Court is "inconsistent
in its application of the presumption." Bradley, Territorial, supra note 126, at 507; see also
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The dissent observed that Congress may only enact legislation having
extraterritorial application as authorized by the Constitution. 243
Congress undoubtedly had authority under the Foreign Commerce
Clause to apply the Sherman Act to the foreign defendants in Hartford
Fire, because their alleged conduct affected U.S. interests. 244 "[T]he
question . . . [was] whether, and to what extent, Congress . . . exercised
that undoubted legislative jurisdiction .... "245
The Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach thus turned on congres-
sional intent. Two interpretive canons guided ascertainment of that in-
tent: the canon against extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy ca-
non.246 The first canon presumes that when Congress legislates, it
legislates only for U.S. territory.247 This presumption can be overcome by
Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 637, 658-59 (noting Hartford Fire "did not apply a
territoriality presumption . . . notwithstanding its decision only two years earlier in
Aramco"); Dodge, supra note 126, at 87 (describing Hartford Fire as "prominent exception
to the Supreme Court's new devotion to the presumption against extraterritoriality").
However, the majority's focus on "adjudicative jurisdiction (or, more precisely,
abstention)" rather than prescriptive jurisdiction provides at least a partial explanation for
the perceived inconsistency. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 n.9, 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see id. at 797-99 & n.25 (majority opinion) (discussing whether abstention based on
international comity was appropriate); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 168 (citing
Hartford Fire in explaining "courts can take (and sometimes have taken) account of comity
considerations case by case, abstaining where comity considerations so dictate"); Born &
Rutledge, supra note 127, at 670-71 ("Justice Souter accepted the defendants' concession
that jurisdiction existed, and then proceeded on the assumption that comity provided an
additional, discretionary [abstention] defense.").
243. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding Congress
undoubtedly had constitutional authority to apply Sherman Act to conduct at issue in
Hartford Fire); see also Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 578-79, 581-82 (noting
"Framers granted Congress only limited legislative powers" and even "foreign commerce
power is not without limits"). For a discussion of federal limits on state legislation with
extraterritorial application or effects, see id. at 584-612.
244. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813-14.
245. Id. at 814; see also id. at 813 ("[T]be extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act . . . turn[s] on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory
power over the challenged conduct."); cf. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 379
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Congress .. . has the sole authority to determine the
extraterritorial reach of domestic laws. . . ."); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is our task to determine whether Congress intended the
protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American employers
outside of the United States."), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)
(2006)).
246. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814-15.
247. Id. at 814. The Supreme Court had endorsed a strong version of this
presumption only two years earlier in Aramco. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-59 ("We assume
that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Therefore, unless there is 'the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,' we
must presume [a statute] 'is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.'" (citations
omitted)); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Book Review, 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 146, 148-49 (2010)
[hereinafter Bradley, Book Review] (discussing Aramco's strong reaffirmation of the
presumption). Moreover, the Court invoked the presumption in two other cases decided
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evidence of contrary intent.24 8 Broad boilerplate language referring, for
example, to any business is insufficient. 24 9 While the Sherman Act con-
tained such boilerplate, prior decisions had found the presumption of
territoriality overcome so the dissent did not have to analyze that issue
afresh. 250  It was "well established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially." 25 1
In light of precedent establishing that antitrust law extends extrater-
ritorially, neither Hartford Fire nor Hoffmann-La Roche focused on the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. 252 The status of the presumption has
been a matter of debate.25 3 The Court recently entered the debate in a
the same year as Hartford Fire, one of which was decided only a week before Hartford Fire.
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74, 176, 188 (1993) (citing Aramco
and applying presumption against extraterritoriality); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
203-04 & n.5 (1993) (same). The Court has noted the presumption in more recent cases
as well. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005) (analogizing to
presumption against extraterritoriality in determining scope of phrase "any court"); id. at
399-401 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disputing majority's presumption analogy while noting
presumption is "well-recognized"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (declining to
apply presumption where case involved detainees held in United States's territorial
jurisdiction); id. at 500-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's refusal to apply
presumption). Compare Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371-72 (opining in dicta and over
dissent that "the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed 'in interstate or foreign
commerce,' so this is surely not a statute in which Congress had only 'domestic concerns in
mind'" (citations omitted)), with id. at 378 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I do not read
into § 1343's coverage of frauds executed 'in interstate or foreign commerce'
congressional intent to give § 1343 extraterritorial effect." (citations omitted)). In Aramco,
the Court concluded that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially so the Court did not
have to engage the Charming Betsy canon. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47, 259.
248. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, "[t]he
presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world
applies with particular force in patent law." Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
454-55 (2007).
249. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Id. Justice Scalia indicated that "if the question were not governed by precedent,
it would be worth considering whether that presumption controls the outcome here." Id.;
see also Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 647 (suggesting presumption would have
prevented extraterritorial application of Sherman Act absent reliance on precedent).
251. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.
252. Cf. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2891 n.7 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (describing Hartford Fire as "declining to apply
presumption [against extraterritoriality] in assessing question of Sherman Act
extraterritoriality"); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158-59
(2004) (focusing on whether, under Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
extraterritorial Sherman Act applied to certain independent foreign injury); Dodge, supra
note 126, at 99-100 (arguing precedent did not require extraterritorial application of
Sherman Act in Hartford Fire and Court did not invoke presumption against
extraterritoriality because of "the fact that the defendant[s'] extraterritorial conduct had
caused harmful effects within the United States").
253. Compare Raustiala, supra note 127, at 99 ("Today the presumption is frequently
overcome, sometimes because Congress does make clear its intent to regulate
extraterritorially and sometimes because courts simply soften the test."), id. at 124
("[S]trong invocations of the judicial presumption against extraterritoriality ... are much
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case that supplements Hartford Fire and Hoffmann-La Roche. In Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., which addressed the reach of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court emphasized that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies "in all cases" and has teeth:
"When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial applica-
tion, it has none."254 That does not mean that a statute must clearly state
that it applies abroad; context may disclose an extraterritorial reach.2 5 5
In Morrison, there was no contextual evidence to overcome the presump-
tion.2 56 When the presumption holds, a statute may nonetheless reach
multinational action as a result of domestic elements of that action, pro-
vided that those domestic elements are "the focus of the" statute.2 5 7 This
possibility moderates the effect of the presumption, though it does not
eliminate its constraints. 25 8 Among other things, the presumption
against extraterritoriality still guides the search for the statute's focus. 25 9
In Morrison, this search, conducted in the presumption's light, led to the
conclusion that section 10 (b) applies " [to] transactions in securities listed
on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities,"
more the exception than the rule."), id. at 178 (suggesting extraterritoriality principles
have arguably not been applied consistently across different areas of domestic law), and
Bradley, Territorial, supra note 126, at 531-35 (noting de facto inconsistency in Supreme
Court's treatment of presumption), with Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649, 691 (2000) (noting while some scholars have questioned
presumption's continued viability, Supreme Court has reaffirmed presumption and lower
courts continue to apply it), Bradley, Territorial, supra note 126, at 512-13, 517-19
(same), id. at 567-69 (invoking Bowman principle as means to harmonize what would
otherwise appear to be inconsistent reliance on presumption against extraterritoriality in
different areas of law), and Bradley, Book Review, supra note 247, at 148-49 ("By the
1980s, many commentators had come to believe that the Supreme Court was moving away
from [the] presumption [against extraterritoriality], but the Court strongly reaffirmed it in
1991 in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco)."). See generally Born & Rutledge,
supra note 127, at 617-19, 632-33 (describing historical prominence, ebbing, and recent
revitalization of presumption against extraterritoriality); Dodge, supra note 126, at 85-87
(same).
254. 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
255. Id. at 2883.
256. As the Court explained, in a statute governing actions in interstate commerce, a
"general reference to foreign commerce in the definition of 'interstate commerce'" is
insufficient to overcome the presumption. Id. at 2874.
257. Id. at 2884.
258. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 246-47, 259
(1991) (concluding Title VII did not "appl[y] extraterritorially to regulate the employment
practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens abroad"),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat.
1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006)).
259. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 & n.10 (concluding that presumption against
extraterritoriality required statutory phrase "'purchase or sale, of ... any security not'"
registered on a domestic exchange to refer only to "domestic purchases and sales"
(emphasis omitted)). Principles of prescriptive comity may also guide the search. See id.
at 2885 ("reject[ing] the notion that [section 10(b)] reaches [non-transactional] conduct
in this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad" given obvious "probability of
incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries").
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but not to deceptive "conduct in this country affecting exchanges or
transactions abroad."2 60
In reaffirming the propriety and strength of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Morrison Court expressly rejected deviations from
the presumption that had embroiled lower courts in "divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the [extraterritorial]
situation before the court."261 That analysis had embraced considera-
tions such as whether the targeted action involved conduct on U.S. terri-
tory or substantially affected the United States or its citizens.2 62
Morrison's reaffirmation of the presumption, though relatively
strong, does not mean that the presumption will always hold. In United
States v. Bowman, the Court explained that the very nature of the conduct
Congress prohibited, and the consequences of limiting the statute's appli-
cation to U.S. borders, may demonstrate that Congress intended to apply
the statute extraterritorially notwithstanding the presumption.2 6 3
Bowman involved a conspiracy to charge a U.S.-owned company, the
Emergency Fleet Corporation, for more fuel than was actually deliv-
ered.26 4 The alleged conspiratorial acts occurred variously on the high
seas, on a U.S.-owned vessel in a foreign port, and in a foreign city. 265
The statute on which the indictment rested did not explicitly define its
territorial reach. 266 It referred generally to the knowing presentment of
"a false claim against the United States . . . to any officer of the civil,
military or naval service ... or any corporation in which the United States
is a stockholder."2 67 The reference to a corporation in which the United
States owned stock was evidently crafted to reach fraud against the Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation, which "was expected to engage in, and did en-
260. Id. at 2884, 2885.
261. Id. at 2881; see also id. at 2877-81 (describing and rejecting lower courts'
application of balancing test rather than presumption against extraterritoriality). But see
id. at 2890 (Stevens,J., concurring in thejudgment) (arguing in section 10(b) context that
Court has unanimously recognized that courts must "divin[e] what Congress would have
wanted" (alteration in original)).
262. Id. at 2879.
263. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-102 (1922). This is not to suggest that
the Bowman principle will be invoked to overcome the presumption in any case where a
suspect may otherwise go free. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 148-49, 213-14 (noting
until Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) many civilians accompanying
military overseas escaped prosecution due to jurisdictional gap caused by territorial nature
of "relevant federal criminal statutes" and explaining MEJA did not entirely close gap).
But the principle expands the extraterritorial reach of criminal law by shifting "from a
theory of 'territorial commission' to a theory of 'territorial security.'" Id. at 164 (quoting
Lawrence Preuss, American Conception of the Jurisdiction with Respect to Conflicts of
Law on Crime, 30 Transactions Grotius Soc'y 184, 198 (1944)). For a brief discussion of
how the circuit courts have understood (and arguably misinterpreted) Bowman, see John
H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 351, 393 (2010).
264. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 95-96.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 97-100 & n.1.
267. Id. at 101; see also id. at 100 n.1 (providing full statutory language).
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gage in, a most extensive ocean transportation business" touching "every
great [open] port of the world. . . . [Moreover, t]he same section of the
statute protect[ed] the arms, ammunition, stores, and property of the
army and navy from [similar] fraudulent devices." 268 Given the interna-
tional activities of the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Army and
Navy, the fraud sought to be prohibited could occur as easily abroad as at
home.269 In light of these functional considerations, the Court could not
conclude that Congress intended to exclude from the statute's reach
fraud committed by U.S. nationals on "private and public vessels of the
United States on the high seas and in foreign ports and beyond" U.S.
territory.270 The statute fit within a class of criminal statutes "enacted
because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruc-
tion, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own
citizens, officers, or agents."27 1 The statute extended abroad notwith-
standing the presumption.
A conclusion that a statute applies extraterritorially does not mean
that it applies without limitation, however. 2 72 How far statutes like the
Sherman Act apply extraterritorially is informed by the second canon:
the Charming Betsy canon. Under the Charming Betsy canon:
"[A] n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains ...
Though it clearly has constitutional authority to [legislate in ex-
cess of international restraints], Congress is generally presumed
not to have exceeded . .. customary international-law limits on
jurisdiction to prescribe.2 7 3
268. Id. at 102.
269. See id. at 99-102 (noting "wide field for such frauds upon the Government ...
beyond the land jurisdiction of the United States").
270. Id. at 102.
271. Id. at 98.
272. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (concluding
extraterritorial reach of statute depends both on "whether, and to what extent, Congress
has exercised" its prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate extraterritorial actors and activities
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 815 ("[E]ven where the presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply, statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if
that regulation would conflict with principles of international law."); id. at 817 (noting
courts enforce prescriptive comity in "interpreting the scope of laws their legislatures have
enacted"); id. at 817-18 (explaining prescriptive comity is "part of determining whether
the Sherman Act prohibits the conduct at issue"); see also Bradley, Territorial, supra note
126, at 533 ("Only after [the] question [of extraterritoriality] is answered in the affirmative
is it proper . . . to consider whether the facts 'of this case' fall within the intended
extraterritorial reach of the legislation."); cf. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2884 n.9 (2010) (noting if section 10(b) applied extraterritorially "we would not
need to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them
(barring some other limitation)").
273. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)); see also
id. at 817 (reasoning prescriptive comity "is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws,
and courts assume it has been exercised when they come to interpreting the scope of laws
their legislatures have enacted").
2274 [Vol. 110:2228
2010] EQUIVALENCE, DUALITY, AMD NON-SELF-EXECUTION 2275
This presumption is consistent with the notion of "'prescriptive com-
ity': the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach
of their laws."274
In applying the Charming Betsy canon, the Hartford Fire dissent did
not clearly define international law on prescriptive jurisdiction.2 7 5
Rather, the dissent relied on the Restatement's2 7 6 summary of that law as
that summary "appear[ed] fairly supported" by Supreme Court and other
federal precedents and as the outcome in Hartford Fire would be the same
"under virtually any conceivable test that takes account of foreign regula-
tory interests." 277 International law, per the Restatement, recognizes that
states may enact laws with extraterritorial application or effect on several
grounds:2 78 (a) the territorial principle, which permits a state to regulate
actors, property, and actions within its territory, including certain actions
that are intended to or actually produce effects, or that take place only in
part, within the territory;279 (b) the nationality principle, which allows a
state to govern its nationals at home or abroad;280 (c) the passive person-
ality principle, which authorizes a state to prohibit certain extraterritorial
acts by non-nationals against its nationals;2 8 1 (d) the protective principle,
which permits a state to legislate regarding extraterritorial conduct by
non-nationals "that is directed against the security of the state or against a
limited class of other state interests";28 2 and (e) the universal principle,
which allows a state to regulate offenses that do not fit within the previous
grounds but that the international community recognizes as offenses "of
universal concern."28 3
274. Id. at 817.
275. See id. at 818 (relying instead on Restatement (Third) but acknowledging
"[w] hether the Restatement precisely reflects international law in every detail matters little
here").
276. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403
(1987).
277. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Phillip Trimble
has argued that Justice Scalia "got the law wrong," both as a matter of customary
international law and as a matter of domestic law of extraterritoriality. Phillip R. Trimble,
The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89
Am. J. Int'l L. 53, 54-56 (1995).
278. Justice Scalia noted that under international law a nation must first possess
"some 'basis' for jurisdiction to prescribe" before determining whether the exercise of that
jurisdiction is reasonable. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818. Justice Scalia did not explicitly
identify the international law basis for applying the Sherman Act to the London reinsurers
in Hartford Fire, but the territorial principle (in its objective form) certainly provided a
basis. See id. at 796 (majority opinion) ("[I]t is well established ... that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States.").
279. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(1).
280. Id. § 402(2).
281. Id. § 402 cmt. g.
282. Id. § 402(3).
283. Id. § 404.
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If the first four principles provide grounds for applying a state's law
but the legislation will apply to actions or persons connected to another
state, extraterritorial application of the legislation must not be unreason-
able.28 4 Whether exercising prescriptive jurisdiction is unreasonable in
any particular case is a multifactored inquiry that may consider such
things as the ties between the regulating state and the actor regulated or
person protected, the regulating state's interest in the regulation, "the
extent to which other states regulate" and welcome regulation of the be-
havior, the regulation's consistency with the international order and with
other states' regulation, and the impact of the regulation on justified
expectations.2 8 5
In Hartford Fire, these considerations clearly pointed "against applica-
tion of United States [antitrust] law" to the foreign reinsurers. 286 The
relevant activity "took place primarily in the United Kingdom" and the
defendants were "British corporations and British subjects having their
principal place of business or residence outside the United States."28 7
Britain had a weighty regulatory interest with regard to reinsurance and
had "established a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the
London reinsurance markets."28 8 By contrast, the United States's regula-
tory interest was slight, as evidenced by the fact that federal law permits
state legislation "to override the Sherman Act in the insurance field" with
limited exception.2 8 9 As a result, it was unreasonable to apply the
Sherman Act and improper to assume, absent contrary indication from
the statute, that Congress intended to do so.2 9 0
While the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis in Hartford Fire occurred
only in dissent, it was largely endorsed by the Court in Hoffmann-La
Roche.29 1 There the Court addressed the prescriptive scope of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA).292 The FTAIA ex-
cludes from Sherman Act liability conduct tied to international com-
merce unless "(roughly speaking) that conduct significantly harms im-
284. Id. § 403(1); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-19
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying Restatement (Third)'s reasonableness
requirement). But see Knox, supra note 263, at 361 & n.59 (noting Restatement's
unreasonableness analysis "has been criticized as not reflecting customary international
law").
285. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403(2);
see also Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying Restatement
(Third)'s reasonableness considerations).
286. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 577 (reading Hoffmann-La Roche as
"suggest[ing] that principles of international comity serve to guide the interpretation of
federal statutes that could have extraterritorial effect").
292. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159, 161 (2004).
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ports, domestic commerce, or American exporters." 293 The Court was
asked to decide whether, under the FTAIA, Sherman Act liability extends
to "significant foreign anticompetitive conduct with . . . an adverse do-
mestic effect" in a suit based solely on foreign harm. 294 The Court con-
cluded that the FTAIA does not impose Sherman Act liability "for two
main reasons."2 9 5 Both reasons bear on congressional intent, indicating
that congressional intent controls the extraterritorial reach of statutes as
Hartford Fire had suggested.
First, the Court "must assume" that "Congress ordinarily seeks to fol-
low" customary international law.2 9 6 This principle, the Court (including
Justice Souter) noted, is reflected in the Restatement, the Charming Betsy
canon, and Justice Scalia's Hartford Fire dissent. 297 Because of this princi-
ple, the "Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unrea-
sonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations."2 98
Application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign activity "can interfere with a
foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own commercial af-
fairs."2 99 The application "is nonetheless reasonable" to the extent it "re-
flect[s] a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused."3 0 0 But interference with foreign
sovereign authority is not reasonable where anticompetitive conduct is
foreign, "causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone
gives rise to the plaintiffs claim."30 1 In such a case, the Restatement fac-
tors that inform reasonableness-"connections with [the] regulating na-
tion, harm to that nation's interests, [the] extent to which other nations
regulate [the conduct], and the potential for conflict" 3 02 -provide insub-
293. Id. at 158.
294. Id. at 159.
295. Id. at 164; see also id. at 159 (holding "a purchaser [abroad] could not bring a
Sherman Act claim based on foreign harm").
296. Id. at 164; see also id. at 169 (arguing that Court must assume Congress would
not impose "America's antitrust policies . . . in an act of legal imperialism, through
legislative fiat").
297. Id. at 164; see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 143
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford Fire for
Charming Betsy canon).
298. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164.
299. Id. at 165.
300. Id.
301. Id. (emphasis omitted).
302. Id. The Court rejected the notion that similarities between the United States's
and other nations' antitrust law minimized potential "interference with the relevant
interests of other nations." Id. at 167. In prior cases, the Court already found differences
in nations' substantive antitrust law. Id. (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993), as one such case). Moreover, nations "disagree dramatically
about appropriate remedies"; other governments worry that providing treble damages
under U.S. law will undercut the policies embodied in their domestic antitrust law and
discourage foreign firms from cooperating with foreign antitrust authorities to secure
amnesty from prosecution. Id. at 167-68.
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stantial 'justification for [the] interference."3 0 3  A contrary holding
would permit a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign defendant for foreign
injury based on foreign anticompetitive conduct as part of a cartel, pro-
vided that a separate plaintiff had a claim against a separate member of
the cartel for U.S. injury.30 4 The Court could not conclude that Congress
intended such a result.30 5
Second, the Court found nothing in the text or history of the FTAIA
suggesting that Congress intended to significantly expand the application
of the Sherman Act to foreign action.3 0 6 Congress did not enact the
FTAIA against a clear judicial understanding that the Sherman Act would
govern situations like that in Hoffmann-La Roche.307 The language of the
FTAIA applies the Sherman Act "to foreign 'conduct' with a certain kind
of harmful domestic effect" that produces "'a claim"' (rather than "'the
plaintiffs claim'").soa Certainly, this language could be read to make for-
eign conduct actionable even for plaintiffs who experience a foreign
rather than the requisite domestic effect.30 9 However, such a reading is
improbable.3 10 And even if it were "the more natural reading," it would
be inconsistent with the FTAIA's purpose, as discerned from the Act's
history and the principles of prescriptive comity, and should be rejected
in favor of a reasonable interpretation consistent with statutory pur-
pose.3 11 In short, refusal to apply the Sherman Act in this case was sup-
The Court likewise rejected the suggestion that problems from applying the Sherman
Act to cases of independent foreign injury could be addressed through case-by-case
abstention (a possibility contemplated by the majority in Hartford Fire). Id. at 168-69.
Case-by-case determinations would be so complex that procedural costs "could themselves
threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the integrity of its own
antitrust enforcement system." Id.
303. Id. at 165.
304. Id. at 166-67.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 169. Eschewing reliance on statutory history (and purpose), Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred because the FTAIA's language "is readily susceptible of the
interpretation the Court provides and because only that interpretation is consistent with
the principle that statutes should be read in accord with the customary deference to the
application of foreign countries' laws within their own territories." Id. at 176 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
307. Id. at 169-73 (majority opinion).
308. Id. at 173 (quoting Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a(2) (2006)).
309. Id. at 173-74.
310. See id. at 174 (rejecting such a reading as "not convincing").
311. Id.
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ported by the history and purpose of the FTAIA312 and principles of pre-
scriptive comity.31 3
Hartford Fire and Hoffmann-La Roche, together with Morrison and
Bowman, produce an extraterritoriality analysis that turns on congres-
sional intent. That intent is informed both by the presumption against
extraterritoriality3 14-little discussed between the two principal cases
given precedent for the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law-and
the Charming Betsy canon. The Charming Betsy canon focuses on the rea-
sonableness of extraterritorial application when the regulated conduct or
person has ties to another state. Other evidence of congressional intent,
including text, history, and purpose, may confirm or overcome the con-
clusion supported by the two presumptions.3 15
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND
TREATIES IN THEIR AREAS OF SECONDARY APPLICATION
Boumediene, Hartford Fire, Hoffmann-La Roche, and Medellin provide
current data on how the Supreme Court treats the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties in their areas of secondary application. A comparison of this
judicial treatment reveals that statutes fare the worst.
A. Even Under a Broad Notion of Non-Self-Execution, Treaties Fare Better
Than Statutes
Doctrinally, the Constitution, statutes, and treaties receive similar
treatment from at least one perspective-the considerations governing
312. While the Court lists statutory purpose as a separate consideration, "the FTAIA's
basic intent" was discerned from its history and principles of comity. Id. Consequently,
one might read Hoffinann-La Roche to suggest that the Charming Betsy canon may prevail
over the most natural reading of statutory text at least where the statute's history supports a
less obvious but nonetheless reasonable alternative reading. See id. (noting "respondents'
linguistic arguments might show that respondents' reading is the more natural reading"
but "considerations ... of comity and history ... make clear that the respondents' reading
is not consistent with the FTAIA's basic intent").
313. Id. at 174-75. These considerations could not be overcome by the empirically
suspect policy claim that applying the Sherman Act would increase deterrence and "help
protect Americans against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury." Id. at 174.
314. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("[The
presumption against extraterritoriality] is a valid approach whereby unexpressed
congressional intent may be ascertained." (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949))), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006));
Dodge, supra note 126, at 112-25 (recognizing various purposes presumption against
extraterritoriality may serve-some focused on concerns other than discerning Congress's
actual intent-but concluding presumption legitimately assists in identifying congressional
intent).
315. See Dodge, supra note 126, at 123 ("[S]ince Aramco, both the Supreme Court
and the lower courts have looked to 'all available evidence' in determining whether the
presumption [against extraterritoriality] has been rebutted." (footnote omitted) (quoting
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993))).
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the application of all three sources in their areas of secondary application
substantially overlap.3 1 6 Lawmaker intent figures in the analysis for each
source of law. Moreover, in all three contexts, practical consequences
play a role. For example, whether statutes reasonably apply extraterritori-
ally depends in part on how application of a statute will affect "justified
expectations" and whether application will conflict with another state's
law.3 1 7 Whether the Constitution limits actions abroad turns in part on
whether application of those limits presents practical difficulties in light
of the circumstances in which application must occur.3 1 8 The practical
consequences of classifying a treaty as self-executing-such as the threat
of unassailable ICJ judgments that would preempt U.S. law-bear on
whether treaties are judicially enforceable without implementation. 3 19
The effect on foreign relations likewise plays a role in analyzing the
secondary application of each source. The various factors that determine
reasonableness-such as the interest of another state in legislating and
the possibility of conflict with another state's regulation-all bear on the
foreign relations effects of applying U.S. law extraterritorially.3 20 Indeed,
the possibility of offending other states dominates the assessment of
whether extraterritorial application of a statute is reasonable.3 2 1 Foreign
relations considerations guide the enforceability of treaties and the
Constitution as well. In Medellin, the threat that United States treatymak-
ing might be hampered (potentially affecting relations with other states)
led the Court to reject a dominant role for the judiciary in deciding when
316. Empirically, by contrast, one might intuit that treaties are enforced domestically
more than the Constitution is extraterritorially. That intuition, of course, may result from
the fact that there are many more treaties governing the United States' international
relations than there are constitutional provisions that might restrain the United States
abroad. Similarly, when differences in the numbers of treaties and statutes are accounted
for, it is conceivable that treaties receive greater domestic enforcement than statutes
receive extraterritorial enforcement. Why? Perhaps lawmakers typically act consistent with
the presumption against extraterritoriality; they generally legislate only for U.S. territory.
See supra note 138 (identifying cases and commentators asserting Congress's domestic
focus). And yet it might be said that treatymakers generally intend to create international
obligations rather than domestic law (despite the absence of a formal judicial presumption
to that effect). The Supremacy Clause allows those obligations to become domestically
enforceable federal law. But the Supremacy Clause also allows statutes to become
domestically enforceable law as to extraterritorial activity. More limited extraterritorial
enforcement of statutes would dilute the suggestion that classifying treaties as non-self-
executing results in discrimination against treaties.
317. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§403(2) (d), (h) (1987).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 161-194 (detailing role of practical
considerations in constitutional extraterritoriality).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 220-223 (describing Medellin's consideration
of practical consequences in self-execution analysis).
320. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 403(2) (listing factors relevant to reasonableness of exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction).
321. See id. (same).
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treaties are self-executing.3 2 2 In Boumediene, the fact that exercise of
habeas jurisdiction would not offend Cuba, given plenary U.S. control at
Guantanamo, supported extension of the habeas right.3 2 3 Deference to
the Executive may also influence the application of at least treaties and
the Constitution as courts try to respect the Executive's role in foreign
affairs and/or military matters. 32 4 In short, while there is not complete
identity of factorS3 25 in deciding the effect of the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties in their areas of secondary application, common themes ap-
pear. From this perspective, one might conclude that the Constitution,
statutes, and treaties receive similar treatment in their secondary roles.
When one looks closer, however, it appears that statutes fare worse
than the Constitution and treaties. While the intent of the relevant
lawmakers surfaces in each source's secondary realm, the analysis of in-
tent, and particularly the relation of intent to functional considerations,
differs with each source of law, leading to differing levels of judicial dis-
cretion to enforce the law in its area of secondary application. As this
Part explains, in the constitutional context original intent may be
shunted in favor of a functional analysis of extraterritoriality. A stand-
alone functional analysis provides the judiciary significant discretion to
fix (and, in historical perspective, extend) the extraterritorial reach of
constitutional limitations. In the treaty context, by contrast, functional
considerations mix with evidence of actual intent in a search for U.S.
treatymaker intent regarding self-execution. The focus on intent as well
as the functional considerations invoked-grounded as they are in a vi-
sion of political branch supremacy in both foreign affairs and lawmak-
ing-tend to limit judicial discretion to enforce treaties as domestic law.
Even that limited discretion appears relatively broad in the statutory con-
text where the Court has rejected a more free-floating functional ap-
proach to congressional intent. With regard to statutes, congressional in-
322. See supra text accompanying note 216 (discussing how court-centered approach
to self-execution could impair United States' ability to enter treaties).
323. See supra text accompanying note 183 (noting absence of risk of offending Cuba
or other sovereign by extending habeas to Guantanamo).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 192-194, 217-218 (noting role of deference
to Executive in constitutional extraterritoriality and treaty self-execution).
325. For example, the existence of alternative remedial options affects treaty self-
execution and constitutional and statutory extraterritoriality, but arguably in divergent
ways. On the one hand, if constitutional protections are secured through other means (for
example, the process for classifying prisoners as enemy combatants) the need to extend
constitutional protections diminishes. If a treaty contemplates alternative means of
enforcement, the likelihood that a treaty is self-executing similarly wanes. On the other
hand, whether other states regulate conduct bears on whether extraterritorial application
of U.S. statutes is reasonable. The mere existence of foreign regulation is not
determinative, however. If other states regulate the conduct in the same way as the United
States, application of U.S. law may be reasonable because it would not raise foreign
relations problems to the same extent as application of a conflicting U.S. law. If U.S. law
conflicts, the foreign state's law would not provide a fully fungible alternative, but the
conflict might suggest that application of U.S. law is nonetheless unreasonable.
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tent is bounded by presumptions against extraterritoriality and violation
of international norms of prescriptive jurisdiction. Functional considera-
tions influence whether these presumptions are overcome, but the exis-
tence of the presumptions cabins the role of functional considerations in
discerning extraterritorial intent and the judiciary's opportunity to apply
statutes abroad. As a result, the doctrinal constraints on statutes in their
area of secondary application are more severe than on treaties or the
Constitution.
1. Judicial Treatment of the Constitution. - As noted above, lawmaker
intent appears as a consideration in determining the secondary role of
each source of law. In Boumediene, the Court attempted to identify the
original intent behind constitutional habeas; only when that attempt
failed did the Court conduct its functional analysis. On these facts, one
might conclude that the Court assigns a dominant role to original intent
in constitutional extraterritoriality. That role, however, may be more for-
mal than real.
The majority could have grounded its decision in original intent,
perhaps supplemented by functional considerations.3 2 6 The majority's
conclusion that the evidence of original intent was indefinite may have
been sincere, but it may also have been an attempt to shunt the confines
of original intent and allow the Court to reach its own conclusion on the
scope of constitutional habeas informed by a multi-factored, functional
analysis. Even in the face of originalist uncertainty, the Court made state-
ments to suggest that it would not always be bound by original intent.
The Court characterized legal commentary and settled precedent from
1789 as potentially "instructive" in its analysis. 32 7 Relatedly, the Court left
open the possibility (as it had before) that the scope of constitutional
habeas has expanded since ratification, rendering precedents from 1789,
326. Justice Scalia, for example, perceived original understanding as alone sufficient
to resolve the constitutional reach of habeas. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,
2303-07 (2008) (Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice Scalia criticized the majority for rejecting in
Boumediene's constitutional context "the historical evidence cited in Rasul [v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004),] to support [the majority's] conclusion about the [statutory] reach of
habeas corpus." Id. at 2300 n.4; cf. Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at
1032-33 (arguing Court could have found "Suspension Clause applies in GuantAnamo"
based solely on its conclusions that "United States exercises de facto sovereignty over
GuantAnamo; the Suspension Clause itself does not contain geographical limitation and
constitutional wartime powers must be read in light of the right to habeas; the history of
extraterritorial extension of the writ is inconclusive but there is evidence that it applied
extraterritorially"); Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown's
Shadow, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 29, 30 (2008) (arguing functionalism, rather than originalism,
is "the methodological framework at the heart of the Supreme Court's contemporary
separation-of-powers jurisprudence").
327. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2248 ("[We seek
guidance as well from founding-era authorities addressing the specific question before
us . . . .").
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the beginning point of analysis. 328 Moreover, when the Court turned to
its functional analysis it made no attempt to cast the analysis as an exer-
cise in constructive intent. Nor did it attempt, in any significant way, to
bolster its functional analysis with evidence of original intent.3 2' Its dis-
cussion of precedents that engaged in functional analyses suggests that
the functional test may be the primary means for determining constitu-
tional reach rather than a secondary approach to be taken only in the
face of an indiscernible original intent.
Unbound by original intent, the functional analysis gives the Court
significant discretion to determine the reach of constitutional limita-
tions.3 30 In (at least recent) historical context where the judiciary gener-
ally has given the Constitution limited extraterritorial scope, the discre-
tion tends to expand the Constitution's foreign role.3 3 1 Relatedly, the
328. Id. at 2248. But cf. id. at 2247 ("The separation-of-powers doctrine, and the
history that influenced its design, . . . must inform the reach and purpose of the
Suspension Clause."); id. at 2248 ("The broad historical narrative of the writ and its
function is central to our analysis . . . .").
329. The Court merely states that the government's de jure sovereignty argument
finds "scant support" in "the history of common-law habeas corpus" and is "inconsistent
with [the Court's] precedents and contrary to fundamental separation-of-powers
principles." Id. at 2253.
330. See, e.g., id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing "the Court's ultimate,
unexpressed goal [in adopting a functional analysis] is to preserve the power to review the
confinement of enemy prisoners held by the Executive anywhere in the world" since "[t] he
'functional' test . .. is so inherently subjective that it clears a wide path for the Court to
traverse in the years to come"); id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("One cannot help
but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority's ambitious opinion,
that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy
regarding enemy combatants."); Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 978
(criticizing Boumediene's functional test-which Professor Burnett calls the "'impracticable
and anomalous' test"-for giving "excessive leeway to courts"); see also Neuman, Strangers,
supra note 137, at 8, 93 (arguing practical balancing approach to constitutional
extraterritoriality-which he terms "global due process" approach-"contemplate[s] an
extraordinary degree of both judicial discretion and deference to the choices of the
political branches"); Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 1003-19,
1042-43 (arguing functional analysis gives courts "nearly unbounded discretion in
selecting the factors relevant to a determination of what constitutional guarantees apply
when and where").
331. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 218 (noting Boumediene "was the first time that
the Supreme Court itself had held that a constitutional right applied to an alien held
outside the United States" and agreeing with Justice Scalia's prediction that "the
functional/practical test . . . would, in time, likely be applied to other constitutional
protections as well"); id. at 243 (noting Boumediene's functional analysis "at least suggests
that in other places subject to extensive and stable American control, though not
American sovereignty, aliens may also fall within the Constitution's reach"); cf. Neuman,
Strangers, supra note 137, at 93 (noting practical balancing approach to constitutional
extraterritoriality holds "out the possibility of more widespread constitutional protection
than had previously been afforded but at the cost of diluting its content"); id. at 116
(describing functional approach as "half a loaf" for those advocating broader reach for
constitutional rights and casting his proposed mutuality approach, under which
constitutional limits attach when United States subjects an individual to its law, as "the full
loaf").
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discretion ensures a prominent role for the judiciary in fixing the
Constitution's reach. The Boumediene Court made that fact explicit in re-
jecting the government's formalist approach to the reach of habeas in
Professor Burnett does not perceive Boumediene as expanding judicial discretion to
extend constitutional rights abroad. According to Professor Burnett, the conventional
account has been that "by the end of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence had established that the Constitution applied to the United States' nonstate
territories, and at the dawn of the twentieth century, the Insular Cases" "held that most of
the Constitution does not 'follow the flag' outside the United States." Burnett, Convenient
Constitution, supra note 37, at 982, 984; see also Burnett, Untied States, supra note 157, at
800-01 (discussing "standard account of Insular Cases" and their break with nineteenth-
century precedent). As a result, Boumediene's invocation of the Insular Cases to conclude
that constitutional protections extend to Guantanamo came as a surprise. Burnett,
Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 982-84. But cf. Raustiala, supra note 127, at
146 (asserting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), transformed Insular Cases from precedents
for strict territoriality into support for Constitution with worldwide reach). Professor
Burnett argues that Boumediene's reliance on the Insular Cases is not so surprising, however,
since the nineteenth-century case law was less clear than the conventional account let on,
and the Insular Cases concluded, as Boumediene correctly noted, that the Constitution
applies of its own force in unincorporated territories. Burnett, Convenient Constitution,
supra note 37, at 983-95; Burnett, Untied States, supra note 157, at 804, 815-16, 819,
824-34; see also supra note 157 (discussing application of Constitution in territories).
Nonetheless, the Insular Cases recognized significant restrictions on the extraterritorial
effect of the Constitution. See Raustiala, supra note 127, at 233 ("The principle that some
constitutional rights could be denied within American borders made it easier to maintain
that no constitutional rights applied outside those borders."); Burnett, Convenient
Constitution, supra note 37, at 983-84, 992-93 ("The Insular Cases undoubtedly created a
new type of second-class territory-the unincorporated territory- ... [b] ut when it comes
to the applicability of constitutional provisions, the line between [unincorporated
territory] and the places comprising the 'United States' turns out . . . to be far blurrier
than the standard account of the Insular Cases suggests."). After Reid v. Covert, there were
scattered efforts by lower courts to expand the reach of constitutional rights, but the
Supreme Court arrested that expansion in Verdugo-Urquidez. Raustiala, supra note 127, at
164-77, 184-86, 189, 204, 210, 234-35, 242-43. Boumediene's functional analysis has
relaxed the restrictions on constitutional extraterritoriality (particularly when viewed in
light of the conventional understanding of the Insular Cases), providing the judiciary
greater discretion to extend the Constitution's reach. But cf. id. at 235 (arguing
Boumediene decision is consistent with the Insular Cases "for the right to contest detention
has long been seen as the sort of fundamental right that exists even in American
colonies"). Nonetheless, Professor Burnett criticizes the functional test for providing
courts too much discretion "to hold constitutional guarantees inapplicable in places
outside the 'United States.'" Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 978; see
also Neuman, Strangers, supra note 137, at 103, 114-16 ("The global due process [i.e.,
functional] approach embodies judicial discretion to reject, after deferential inquiry, the
applicability of constitutional rights to government action abroad in situations where [the
rights]" meet "a low threshold of 'impracticability.'"). Her perspective derives, at least in
part, from the normative, as opposed to purely historical, position that the Constitution
should apply broadly beyond U.S. borders, even if the nature of its enforcement must vary
with the circumstances. See Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 37, at 979
(endorsing Boumediene's conclusion "that the Constitution does not stop where de jure
sovereignty ends" as correct both normatively and as matter "of constitutional text and
structure, history and ... precedent[ ]"); id. at 981-82 (arguing "functional considerations
should not ordinarily resolve the question of whether a constitutional provision applies" but
rather "should be relevant to the question of how a provision . . . may be enforced").
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part on separation of powers grounds, arguing that the government's for-
mal, de jure sovereignty limitation on habeas would allow the President
and Congress "to switch the Constitution on or off at will" in "a striking
anomaly in our tripartite system of government. "3 3 2 Likewise, while the
Court recognized the need for deference to the Executive with regard to
the procedural and substantive standards governing detention of possible
terrorists, the Court emphasized the need for judicial review of detention
as well.3 33
Boumediene thus introduces a significant level of judicial discretion
into the Constitution's foreign affairs role. The political branches do not
control the Constitution's extraterritorial reach by statute or treaty. The
Court fixes that reach and does so in light of functional considerations
that elide the restraints of more categorical approaches based on such
things as formal sovereignty.3 34 The result is that constitutional limita-
tions are likely to extend further than they have in recent history.
2. Judicial Treatment of Treaties. - The intent of the lawmakers ap-
pears to play a larger role in identifying the domestic effect of treaties.
The Medellin Court relied, in small part, on express evidence of the
treatymakers' intent regarding self-execution.3 35 This reliance may have
resulted from the availability of evidence directly on point, in which case
the difference between Medellin and Boumediene may not be in their com-
mitment to intent, but rather in the scope of evidence available to iden-
tify intent.
However, Medellin attempted to tether its analysis to intent-even
when invoking functional considerations-in a way that Boumediene did
not. Like Boumediene, Medellin focused on functional considerations, such
as the practical consequences of treating ICJ judgments as judicially unas-
sailable federal law.3 3 6 In Medellin, however, the functional considera-
tions mix with, rather than arise separate from, consideration of the
treatymakers' intent.3 3 7 Perhaps this was because the functional consid-
332. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
333. Id. at 2276-77.
334. Some might argue that Boumediene only defines the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution as to aliens located outside the United States' formal sovereignty. Cf.
Raustiala, supra note 127, at 243 ("Boumediene underscored the unique attributes of
Guantanamo, and hence its impact beyond that unusual location is uncertain."). Even if
this were the case, Boumediene expands the potential reach of the Constitution in these
areas. However, Boumediene extracted its functional approach from cases-such as Reid v.
Covert, which addressed the constitutional rights of American citizens abroad-that dealt
with the Constitution's reach more generally. And Boumediene identified citizenship as one
factor to consider in determining the Constitution's reach. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
As a result, it would appear that Boumediene's functional approach may control
constitutional extraterritoriality questions in all situations arising outside formal sovereign
boundaries.
335. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008).
336. See supra Part V.B (describing Medellin's self-execution analysis).
337. See supra Part V.B (describing Medellin's reliance on "functional considerations
in constructing treatymaker intent").
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erations led to a conclusion consistent with the evidence of the
treatymakers' intent. But the Court seems to treat both evidence of the
Executive's and Senate's understanding during the advice and consent
process and the functional considerations as evidence of actual intent.
Indeed, in the final sentence of its self-execution analysis, the Court
states: "Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting his-
tory, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or
Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an in-
ternational tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our
most fundamental constitutional protections.' "338
In light of the coupling of evidence of actual intent with functional
considerations, the intent identified is arguably more constructive than
actual. As a result, the attempt to tie functional considerations to intent
may be little different than the Boumediene Court's shunting of original
intent. Yet the Medellin Court acknowledges some need to ground its de-
cision in the authority of the lawmakers.33 9 Consequently, Medellin argua-
bly manifests at least a marginally greater commitment to lawmaker in-
tent than does Boumediene. This commitment restrains the judiciary in
classifying treaties as enforceable domestic law.
The functional considerations that inform the self-execution analysis
also constrain-rather than expand, as in Boumediene-judicial enforce-
ment of treaties. The functional considerations in Medellin reflect a sepa-
ration of powers vision in which the political branches take the lead in
foreign affairs and lawmaking. 340 To illustrate, suppose that a treaty im-
posed a broad obligation such as the duty to provide due process. A
court could certainly fill such an obligation with content as courts do in
applying the Constitution. 34 1 However, the Medellin Court presumed that
if treaty obligations are not specifically defined, Congress did not intend
judicial enforcement absent congressional implementation.3 4 2 The polit-
ical branches generally should fill vague treaty obligations with content.
The obligation to "undertake[ ] to comply with" ICJ judgments was such
an obligation.34 3 It did not suggest an immediate obligation to judicially
enforce judgments but a range of steps that might be taken to implement
338. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360
(2006)).
339. See supra Part V.B (noting Medellin's focus on treatymaker intent).
340. Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 491, 500-03. I describe these
functional considerations as separation-of-powers-based presumptions. To the extent that
this description is accurate, one might argue that the considerations are more structural
than functional. In partial response, these categories meld, at least to the extent that the
separation of powers presumptions rest on judgments about the relative competencies of
the branches of the federal government.
341. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 42.
342. See id. (noting "presumption . . . that treatymakers do not intend to grant"
authority to "courts to give content to vague standards").
343. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508 (concluding "undertakes to comply" language "is
not a directive to domestic courts").
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ICJ decisions. 3 4 Under Medellin's separation of powers perspective, the
political branches should elect those steps. Although this line of thinking
limits judicial enforcement of treaties, many critics of non-self-execution
agree that treaty obligations may be non-self-executing if they are
vague.34 5 The Court's other separation of powers judgments are more
controversial.34 6
First, the Court considered whether other parties to the relevant
treaties made ICJ judgments immediately enforceable in their domestic
courts.347 The absence of persuasive evidence that other states adopted
this practice supported a finding of non-self-execution on the implicit
presumption that the political branches may, but the judiciary should
not, assume unilateral obligations on behalf of the United States.3 48
Second, the judiciary should be reluctant to classify a treaty as self-
executing if the practical consequences of doing so "give pause."34 9
Treating commitments toward the ICJ as self-executing threatened the
possibility of unassailable ICJ judgments that preempt state and federal
law and void criminal convictions and sentences.35 0 The Court presumed
that express election of such consequences should be left to the political
branches,3 5 1 notwithstanding the fact that the political branches arguably
chose those consequences in accepting the relevant treaty obligations. 352
Third, the Court should be sensitive to the effect of self-execution on
political branch discretion and U.S. foreign relations.35 3 Justice Breyer's
344. Id. at 508-09 & n.5.
345. See supra Part I (discussing circumstances under which even critics of non-self-
execution agree that treaties may be non-self-executing).
346. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 46 (noting "Vdzquez
effectively accepts the presumption that a treaty is non-self-executing if it contains vague
obligations" while acknowledging that "[w]hether any given separation of powers
presumption is appropriate is fertile ground for debate").
347. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 516-17.
348. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 45 ("[S]ince no other
signatory treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts, the Court presumed that the
U.S. treatymakers did not assume a greater obligation . . . ."); Moore, Medellin and the ATS,
supra note 6, at 502 ("Because other nations had not assumed ... an obligation [to enforce
ICJ judgments in domestic courts], the Court concluded that it should not assume a
unilateral obligation to that effect on behalf of the United States.").
349. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 517.
350. Id. at 517-18.
351. See id. at 518 (noting if "Congress is unlikely to authorize automatic judicial
enforceability of [politically sensitive] ICJ judgments, . . . the lesson to draw from that
insight is hardly that the judiciary should decide which judgments are politically sensitive"
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting id. at 560 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting))).
352. See Sloss, Self-Execution Debate, supra note 17 (arguing that allowing judiciary
to enforce ICJ's Avena judgment should not be troubling because political branches in
accepting relevant treaty obligations "decided that the United States [would] comply with
ICJ decisions" (emphasis omitted)).
353. See Moore, Medell(n and the ATS, supra note 6, at 501-02 ("[T]he [Medellin]
Court's concern for both the foreign affairs [dominance and] discretion of the political
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case-by-case, multivariate approach to self-execution would label a treaty
self-executing in some contexts and not in others based on a judicial de-
termination and would hamper the United States's ability to enter trea-
ties with other countries.3 54 Branding the relevant treaty obligations self-
executing would also remove the option of deciding whether and how to
comply with ICJ judgments. 35 5 Perhaps that result would not be troub-
ling in certain circumstances. However, international law and the U.S.
treatymakers contemplated the possibility of both noncompliance and
U.S. veto of any Security Council attempts at enforcement, and thejudici-
ary, under Medellin's separation of powers, should not limit that
discretion.3 56
Fourth and relatedly, the relevant treaties established international
means of enforcing treaty obligations relative to the ICJ.3 57 The Court
presumed in such circumstances that the treatymakers would not expect
the treaty to be self-executing, obviating-at least in some situations-the
need for the contemplated international enforcement.3 5 8
As noted, each of these considerations reflects a separation of powers
in which the judiciary takes second seat in lawmaking and foreign affairs.
The considerations fall short of establishing a formal presumption of
non-self-execution.35 9 Together, however, they limit judicial opportunity
to classify a treaty as self-executing and immediately enforceable as do-
branches and U.S. relations with other countries supported the conclusion that the
relevant treaty obligations were not self-executing.").
354. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 515.
355. Id. at 507-11.
356. See id. at 511 (rejecting elimination of "the option of noncompliance" through
transfer of compliance decisions to judiciary).
357. Id. at 507-11.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Breyer's dissent
'that the text and history of the Supremacy Clause, as well as this Court's treaty-related
cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution"); Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra
note 6, at 171-72 ("Medellin need not be read as ... requiring a presumption against self-
execution.... If the Court was suggesting any presumption ... it was probably just a
presumption against giving direct effect to ICJ judgments." (emphasis omitted)); Young,
supra note 11, at 118 (noting some cite Medellin for presumption against self-execution but
concluding such reading "rather drastically overreads" Medellin); cf. Carlos Manual
V:zquez, Agora: Less Than Zero?, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 563, 571-72 (2008) (arguing Medellin
should be read as presuming self-execution). But cf. Hollis, supra note 27, at 413 ("The
Court's approach ruled out any presumption of self-execution, and in searching for
affirmative evidence of intent, may imply a presumption against self-execution."); Parry,
Rewriting, supra note 52, at 69 ("[Tlhe Court's actual reasoning strongly hints at a
presumption against self-execution (even as it stops short of actually proclaiming
one) . .. ."); Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 Mo. L. Rev.
1007, 1018 n.57 (2008) ("[Medellin] created what arguably amounts to a presumption
against self-execution."); Vdzquez, Safeguard of Nationalism, supra note 6, at 1618 ("[T]he
self-execution test applied by the majority appears to presume that a treaty is not self-
executing unless there is affirmative evidence that the parties intended that the treaty have
domestic legal force."); Rosenkranz, supra note 30 (inquiring whether Medellin Court
implicitly presumed non-self-execution).
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mestic law.3 6 0 That result, though arguably inconsistent with Boumediene's
expansion of judicial authority, was not accidental. In responding to
Justice Breyer's proposed analysis, the Court emphasized the impropriety
of expanding the judiciary's foreign affairs and lawmaking power
through self-execution analysis.36 1
3. judicial Treatment of Statutes. - Restrictions on judicial discretion
to classify treaties as self-executing, however, are not as severe as those on
the extraterritorial application of statutes. The ultimate determinant of
statutory extraterritoriality is congressional intent. The Court recognizes,
for example, that Congress can apply a statute beyond the boundaries
imposed by international law.3 62 At the same time, as noted, the Court
enlists two canons of interpretation that presume that Congress did not
intend to legislate extraterritorially3 63 and did not intend to exceed the
limits of international law.364 Application of each canon can involve
functional considerations. In Bowman, for example, the Court found the
presumption against extraterritoriality overcome given the nature of the
activity Congress sought to prohibit-conduct easily and as likely commit-
360. See Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 491 ("[Medellin's] self-
execution analysis includes considerations that will likely lead lower courts to classify
treaties as non-self-executing more frequently.").
361. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514-16 ("To read a treaty [as Justice Breyer would] so
that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes does not is tantamount to
vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law" and
"could hobble the United States' efforts to negotiate and sign international agreements");
Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 501 ("The Constitution's assignment of the
power to create treaties . . . to the political branches excludes the role Justice Breyer
assigns to the judiciary.").
362. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922) (noting statute's
territorial reach is "a question of statutory construction" and "when not specifically defined,
depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the
crime and upon" limitations imposed by international law (emphasis added));
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 402 cmt. i, 403
cmt. g (1987) (explaining extraterritorial statutes are valid and binding on agencies and
courts when Congress clearly intends to apply statutes beyond limits of international law);
Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 576, 578-79, 583, 613-14 ("Congress has the power to
enact legislation that violates international law."). But cf. id. at 576, 583-84 ("A few courts
have held that contemporary jurisdictional limits of international law are coextensive with
constitutional limits on federal legislative jurisdiction."); id. at 579, 582-83 (recognizing
"the Due Process Clause might preclude extension of federal law to conduct abroad that
has only de minimus contact with or effect upon the United States or its nationals," while
acknowledging "no reported federal court decision has held an extraterritorial application
of substantive U.S. law unconstitutional").
363. For a brief history of, justifications for, and criticisms of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see generally Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 614-38, 640-48;
Bradley, Territorial, supra note 126, at 510-19, 545-57, 560-69.
364. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 127, at 576-77, 617 (noting judicial use of
presumption against extraterritoriality and Charming Betsy canon in fixing extraterritorial
reach of statutes); Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 142, at 489-90 (same).
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ted abroad as at home-and the practical consequences of preventing
the statute from reaching the extraterritorial conduct.3 6 5
Functional considerations inform application of the Charming Betsy
canon as well. In determining whether a particular extraterritorial appli-
cation is consistent with international law, courts should first identify one
of five grounds, discussed above, for exercising prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.3 66 Some of these grounds parallel the functional considerations in
Boumediene: whether the regulated person or activity is within the state's
territory, whether the person regulated or harmed is a national of the
regulating government, and whether regulation is necessary to a state's
core interests, including security interests.3 67
Functional considerations likewise guide the reasonableness analysis
that ensues when a state has a basis to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
but that exercise targets "a person or activity having connections with an-
other state."3 68 Reasonableness may turn on such things as whether there
is a territorial link between the action or actor regulated and the regulat-
ing state, the effect of the regulation on justified expectations, "the ex-
tent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activ-
ity," and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state."3 69
These considerations focus on the effect of extraterritorial application of
a statute on another sovereign's authority.3 70 Many of these factors track
Boumediene's consideration of such things as the link of the government
activity regulated (i.e., apprehension and detention) to U.S. territory and
the link between the detainees and the United States.
The considerations in the statutory context, however, are critically
different. In Boumediene, functional considerations supported judicial dis-
cretion to extend the Constitution's protections extraterritorially. In
Medellin, functional considerations informed treatymaker intent. In the
statutory context, the Court expressly rejected "excessive reliance on
functional considerations and reconstructed congressional intent" in fix-
ing extraterritoriality.3 7 1 Functional considerations in the statutory con-
text are not permissive guidelines for the courts to decide "what Congress
365. See supra text accompanying notes 263-271 (discussing Bowman); cf. Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (classifying Guantanamo as within United States' territorial
jurisdiction and not subject to presumption against extraterritoriality given United States'
"complete jurisdiction and control" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 276-283 (listing Restatement grounds on
which states may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction).
367. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 &
cmt. f.
368. Id. § 403(1).
369. Id. § 403(2).
370. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(indicating rule that "Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations" reflects customary international
law's reasonableness requirement).
371. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2891 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2877-81 (majority opinion) (rejecting lower
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would have wanted."37 2 Instead, functional considerations inform
whether the presumptions against extraterritoriality and violation of in-
ternational law are overcome. These presumptions restrain both
Congress and the courts from applying statutes extraterritorially. As the
Supreme Court has illustrated, most recently in Morrison, the presump-
tions sometimes will hold, obstructing extraterritorial application of stat-
utes.37 3 And in all cases, the presumptions will restrict judicial discretion
in statutes' area of secondary application.37 4
In sum, the roles of lawmaker intent, functional considerations, and
ultimately judicial discretion differ significantly in the Constitution's, stat-
utes', and treaties' areas of secondary application. In some cases, original
intent might control the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. At
least when original intent is indeterminate, however, a functional analysis
ensues. The functional analysis provides the judiciary greater discretion
to extend constitutional limitations in foreign relations. With treaties,
the analysis also focuses on intent, but functional considerations combine
with evidence of actual intent to form a sort of hybrid intent. These sepa-
ration of powers-inspired considerations tend toward non-self-execution,
but do not erect a formal presumption against self-execution. As a result,
courts retain limited but still significant discretion to enforce treaties as
domestic law. The functional considerations bearing on the extraterrito-
rial reach of statutes, by contrast, inform presumptions that Congress did
not intend to regulate extraterritorially or in excess of international law.
These presumptions limit judicial discretion to apply statutes
extraterritorially.
The result is that the hurdles the Constitution and treaties face prior
to judicial enforcement in their secondary areas are flatter than the hur-
dles statutes must overcome before being applied extraterritorially, not-
withstanding the inclusion of all three sources in the Supremacy Clause.
The doctrine of non-self-execution results in favorable treatment of trea-
ties vis-t-vis statutes. With regard to the Constitution, at least where in-
tent is unclear, the extraterritorial analysis provides the judiciary greater
space to extend the Constitution's reach. Where all admit the
court's departure from presumption against extraterritoriality toward constructive
congressional intent informed by functional considerations).
372. Id. at 2881.
373. Id. at 2883; see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 246-47,
259 (1991) (concluding Title VII did not "appl[y] extraterritorially to regulate the
employment practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens
abroad"), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a),
105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006)). As noted, the
constraint imposed by the presumption against extraterritoriality is moderated by the fact
that a statute that does not overcome the presumption may nonetheless reach
multinational conduct as a result of domestic aspects of that conduct. See supra text
accompanying note 260 (discussing Morrison).
374. See Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 142, at 490 ("[A]t least in the context of
customary international law, the Charming Betsy canon has been used primarily as a braking
mechanism . . . to restrain the scope of federal enactments.").
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Constitution merits superior treatment at least in the event of conflict,
perhaps this greater opportunity to apply the Constitution in its area of
secondary application is not particularly troubling. Moreover, in prac-
tice, treaties may actually receive greater enforcement in their secondary
arena than does the Constitution. Practical consequences influence the
application of both treaties and the Constitution; it is at least conceivable
that practical difficulties will deter extraterritorial application of the Con-
stitution more than domestic enforcement of treaties.3 7 5
Despite claims that a broad doctrine of non-self-execution discrimi-
nates against treaties and thus violates a constitutional requirement of
equivalent treatment, comparison of judicial treatment of the
Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their areas of secondary application
reveals that even a broad notion of non-self-execution does not discrimi-
nate against treaties (at least as compared to statutes).
B. Implications for Other Debates
The comparison also has important implications for two related de-
bates regarding the domestic status of treaties. The first concerns the
considerations Medellin credited in identifying whether a treaty is self-
executing. As discussed above, Medellin invoked a variety of functional
considerations that reflect separation of powers-based judgments.37 6 For
example, the Court considered the practical consequences of treating ICJ
judgments as binding federal law. Those consequences, which included
the possibility that the ICJ might overturn state convictions and
sentences, were too troubling to be effected by the judiciary without fur-
ther direction from the political branches. Similarly, classifying ICJ judg-
ments as judicially-enforceable federal law would prevent the Executive
from deciding not to comply with ICJ judgments and vetoing any attempt
at enforcement in the Security Council, thereby undermining the
Executive's primary role in foreign affairs.
As briefly noted, these considerations are controversial. Some argue
that they are inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause.3 7 7 To the extent
these considerations reflect respect for political branch primacy in law-
making and foreign affairs, they may not be troubling. On the other
hand, the considerations might go too far. It is one thing to consider
evidence of the treatymakers' intent in deciding whether a treaty is self-
executing. The treatymakers are authorized to decide whether a treaty
375. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254-55 (2008) (noting Insular
Cases' focus on practical difficulties of applying Constitution in territories with different
legal systems).
376. See supra Part VI.A.2 (discussing "functional considerations in Medellin [that]
reflect a separation of powers vision in which the political branches take the lead role in
foreign affairs and lawmaking").
377. See, e.g., Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 13, at 10, 28-31 (identifying
conditions under which treaties may be non-self-executing without endorsing various
Medellin considerations).
2292 [Vol. 110:2228
2010] EQUIVALENCE, DUALITY AND NON-SELF-EXECUTION 2293
should have the full effect that the Supremacy Clause allows.3 7 8 It is an-
other thing to construct treatymaker intent by reference to separation of
powers-inspired functional considerations. Nonetheless, comparison of
judicial treatment of the three Supremacy Clause sources supports reli-
ance on these considerations. In comparative perspective, reliance on
functional considerations (and, indeed, on particular considerations such
as foreign relations effects) appears unexceptional. Functional consider-
ations inform, and in the absence of clear original intent may control, the
secondary application of the Constitution. They likewise guide the extra-
territorial reach of statutes. Comparative analysis in each source's area of
secondary application, at least at the macro level, tips the scale in favor of
the functional considerations endorsed in Medellin.
The comparative analysis introduced in this Essay also informs the
debate over a presumption for or against self-execution. Relying on the
Supremacy Clause, many scholars have endorsed a presumption of self-
execution.3 79 The Restatement supports that position.38 0 Prior to
Medellin, however, lower courts appear to have employed a presumption
against self-execution.3 8 ' That position garnered some scholarly support
378. See Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 29, at 33-47 (developing
constitutional, precedential, and comparative arguments for treatymakers' authority to
create less than Constitution permits). Compare Ted Cruz, Medellfn v. Texas: Part I: Self-
Execution, The Federalist Society Online Debate Series (Mar. 28, 2008), at http://
www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(relying on precedent, history, and treatment of statutes to conclude Constitution permits
non-self-execution), and Rosenkranz, supra note 30 (asserting both treaties and
congressional enactments are supreme federal law "to the extent that they purport to be"
(emphasis omitted)), with Sloss, Self-Execution Debate, supra note 17 (asserting
Supremacy Clause "cannot mean that the treaty makers have the power to decide that
some treaties shall not be federal law").
379. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 201 (supporting self-execution
presumption); Paust, Self-Executing, supra note 41, at 775 (same); Vdzquez, Four
Doctrines, supra note 60, at 700-10 (same); Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 13,
at 2154 n.3, 2175 (same); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 13, at 602
(same). But cf. Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 148 (noting "if there is no
inherent conflict between non-self-execution and the Supremacy Clause" argument for
presumption of self-execution "loses force").
380. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111
reporter's note 5 (1987) ("[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested implementing
legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a strong presumption
that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the political branches, and should be
considered self-executing by the courts.").
381. See, e.g., Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 6, at 136 & n.15, 163 ("[L]ower
courts in the post-World War II period have come close to presuming against self-
execution, at least for multilateral treaties and other treaties not covered by prior lines of
precedent."); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations
Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395, 1429 & n.126 (1999) ("In recent years courts .. . have
instead opted for a more rule-like approach . . . that presumes that a treaty is non-self-
executing.").
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as well.382 While Medellin approved a presumption that treaties do not
create private rights of action, Medellin did not expressly endorse a pre-
sumption for or against self-execution.38 3 At the same time, the func-
tional considerations the Court adopted and the separation of powers
judgments that inform them increase the likelihood of a treaty being clas-
sified as non-self-executing. 38 4 Indeed, some find in Medellin an implicit
adoption of a presumption against self-execution.3 85 Without endorsing
that reading of Medellin or the constitutionality of a presumption against
self-execution, comparison of the judicial treatment of the supreme
sources of law in their secondary arenas provides support for such a pre-
sumption. A presumption against treaty self-execution would parallel the
presumptions that statutes do not apply extraterritorially and do not ex-
ceed international law.
CONCLUSION
The domestic status of treaties has generated longstanding debate.
Scholars resist arguments in favor of non-self-execution that are based on
treaties' unique duality and instead urge Supremacy Clause-mandated
equivalent treatment of treaties. By acknowledging the dual nature of the
Constitution and statutes and comparing judicial treatment of the three
sources of supreme federal law in their areas of secondary application,
this Essay accommodates critics' concern for the exclusive focus on treaty
duality and demonstrates that even a broad doctrine of non-self-
execution results in better treatment for treaties than exists at least for
statutes. The comparison thus supports, contrary to the prevailing schol-
arly position, a broad formulation of non-self-execution, such as that en-
dorsed in Medellin. The comparison likewise suggests the propriety of the
functional considerations employed in Medellin and lends support for a
presumption against self-execution.
382. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 24, at 2093 ("At the very least, courts should obey
the presumption that when the text of a treaty is silent, courts ought to assume that it is
non-self-executing."); Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 34, at 2219-20, 2255 (proposing
"'hard' rule" that treaties in areas of Congress's legislative powers cannot be self-executing
and second-best "'soft' rule . .. requiring the treatymakers to issue a clear statement if they
want a treaty to be self-executing").
383. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008); see Moore, Law(makers) of the
Land, supra note 29, at 46 ("[Medellin] did not expressly adopt a presumption against self-
execution . . . ."); supra note 359 and accompanying text (asserting Medellin did not
establish formal presumption of non-self-execution).
384. Moore, Medellin and the ATS, supra note 6, at 491; Moore, Law(makers) of the
Land, supra note 29, at 46.
385. See supra note 359 (discussing whether Medellhn created presumption against
self-execution).
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